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LAND TRUSTS THAT CONSERVE COMMUNITIES
James J. Kelly, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent property law scholarship has welcomed increased attention
to the relevance of "virtue ethics" to the reshaping of fundamental
concepts within property jurisprudence.1 Several preeminent legal
scholars have issued a brief manifesto stating that "[t]he common con-
ception of property as protection of individual control over valued re-
sources" is "inadequate as the sole basis for resolving property
conflicts or for designing property institutions."'2 Carrying on Aris-
totle's ethical tradition, they urge an exploration of the richness of
human flourishing and the social relationships it entails.3 They have
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on how the law governing various
kinds of property disputes can be recast to support the common good
instead of merely to maximize aggregate individual gain.4 Con-
fronting the transactional half of the identified inadequacy, however,
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1. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
GOOD 8 (2003); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
143, 146 (2003); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 745, 761 & n.65 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Properties of Com-
munity, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 134-45 (2009); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues,
94 CORNELL L. REV 821, 864-74 (2009); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1889, 1938-58 (2005); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1251-65 (2005).
2. Gregory S. Alexander, et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743 (2009).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 773-801 (illustrating how a neo-Aristotelian would
strike sensible balances in controversies over regulatory takings, eminent domain, and nuisance
law); Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 1, at 154-60 (discussing a South African case that dealt
with squatters' rights to land).
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can bring us beyond the focus on the cat-and-mouse game between
market and state actors. Groups of citizens that have found neither
their interests nor their ideals reflected in the activities of the market
and the policies of the state have turned to alternative property-hold-
ing institutions to sustain the gains that they have achieved by re-
sisting threats to their work,5 their homes,6 and their ways of life.7
Inspired by the civil rights movement and community organizing
efforts to defeat Urban Renewal,8 the community economic develop-
ment movement has fostered a variety of institutions that have chal-
lenged conventional corporate and property notions of creating and
distributing wealth.9 With any such innovation, the Community Land
Trust (CLT) model embodies far-sighted collective action for the com-
mon good.10 More than 160 of these democratically controlled com-
munity-based nonprofits have created and sustained resale-restricted
homes, community-owned common spaces, or both, in cities, towns,
and rural areas within and outside the United States. Those CLTs
that have sought to foster economically diverse communities of choice
in inner-city neighborhoods 12 best illustrate a "revolutionary Aristote-
5. See JAMES DEFILIPPIS, UNMAKING GOLIATH: COMMUNITY CONTROL IN THE FACE OF
GLOBAL CAPITAL 61-85 (2004); Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Eco-
nomic Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
321-22 (Sarat & Scheingold eds., 2006); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immi-
grant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 407, 428-45 (1995).
6. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 305-07; DEFILIPPIS, supra note 6, at 87-111; Barbara L.
Bezdek, To Attain the Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local Resident Equity Participation in
Urban Redevelopment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 101-02 (2006).
7. For a discussion of how the residents of Boston's Dudley Street neighborhood responded to
decades of disinvestment and degradation of their land, see PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR,
STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 70-72 (1994); infra Part
II.A.
8. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 7-13
(2001); Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Develop-
ment, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 257, 260-61 (2009),
9. See DEFILIPPIS, supra note 5, at 113; Michael Swack, Community Finance Institutions, in
BEYOND THE MARKET AND THE STATE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 79-80
(Severyn T. Bruyn & James Meehan eds., 1987).
10. See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING LAND-
SCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 18 (2006); JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS
& RICK JACOBUS, THE CITY-CLT PARTNERSHIP: MUNICIPAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY LAND
TRUSTS 2,4 (2008); INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL (2d ed.
2002); David M. Abromowitz, Community Land Trusts and Ground Leases, 1 A.B.A. J. AF-
FORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., Spring 1992, at 5.
11. See Burlington Associates, Community Land Trusts in the United States, http://
www.burlingtonassociates.net/resources/movies/CLTilist8.7.05.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
12. Only a handful of Community Land Trusts (CLTs) in the United States focus on particular
inner-city communities. This Article focuses on CLTs that operate in urban neighborhoods be-
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lianism,"13 one that not only criticizes the instrumentalism and indi-
vidualism that hamper conventional understandings of private land
ownership but also offers a constructive alternative vision.14
Having helped launch the virtue ethics revival with the publication
of After Virtue in 1981,15 Alasdair MacIntyre has constructed a post-
modern Thomistic social philosophy that calls for the cultivation of
the "virtues of acknowledged dependence" 16 through "networks of
giving and receiving. ' 17 His "politics of self-defense" 18 offers an ac-
count of both the need to resist the destructive impacts of the market
and the state and a constructive vision of the local institutions that are
needed to sustain an authentic politics of virtue.19 Although unapo-
logetically idealistic, MacIntyre does not embark upon nor encourage
the laying out of a road map to a utopian future in which nation-states
and capitalist structures succumb to the overwhelming appeal of local
cause they most vividly demonstrate the struggle to create justice in a political economy that is
dominated by market and state institutions.
13. See generally KELVIN KNIGHT, ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY: ETHICS AND POLITICS FROM
ARISTOTLE TO MACINTYRE 1-3, 186-88 (2007) (noting that Maclntyre's Aristotelianism is revo-
lutionary in its "identification of excellence with those who resist rather than exercise institution-
alized power.").
14. Theorists of grassroots organizing and community lawyering have frequently turned to
radically skeptical accounts of political and legal institutions as tools of subordination. See, e.g.,
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1977); ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY & SOCIALIST STRATEGY (2d ed.
2001); GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERINO: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Les-
sons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2128-29 (1990); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV.
1, 55-58 (1990). Other theorists of progressive advocacy have noted that these postmodern re-
ductions of normative dialogue to assertions of personal perspective make sustained cooperative
activity difficult if not impossible. See, e.g., Romand Coles, Liberty, Equality, Receptive Generos-
ity: Neo-Nietzschean Reflections on the Ethics and Politics of Coalition, 90 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
375, 380 (1996); Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12
CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 548 (2006); Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure
and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 468-72; William H. Simon, The
Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-
Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1111-14 (1994).
15. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) (critiquing the En-
lightenment era rejection of socially constituted ethics as inevitably leading to intractable skepti-
cism and indeterminacy in contemporary moral discourse).
16. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 120 (1999) (arguing for a communal ethic centered around the ines-
capable vulnerability of humans as animals).
17. Id. at 146.
18. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Three Perspectives on Marxism: 1953, 1968, 1995, in 2 ETHICS
AND POLITICs 145, 155 (2006).
19. See KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 186-88.
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cooperatives. 20 He does not even foresee a time when the small-scale
political communities that he champions will be able to exist com-
pletely independently of dominant private and public institutions. 21
Thus, any such attempts to create and sustain true justice must be able
to contend continually with both the market and the state for the fore-
seeable future.
Although grassroots efforts to control local economic resources de-
pend heavily on the collective assertion of power, neighborhood activ-
ists seeking the resources that are needed to develop a CLT must also
be able to articulate the social benefits of community-based efforts
that foster equal access to housing and local amenities. As
MacIntyre's categorical rejection of liberal individualism 22 may not it-
self offer the rhetorical tools to persuade many local government offi-
cials or other key supporters, CLT proponents are well-advised to also
look to the work of Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate economist who has
used Aristotelian thought to broaden conventional policy discussions.
Rejecting the maximizing of income as the universal key to quality of
life, Sen urges a focus on capabilities, which he defines as the actual
opportunities to live a quality life.23 He also argues for expanding
conventional economic understanding of rational choice to include
other-regarding motives.24 Sen's neo-Aristotelian correctives support
public investment in CLTs in order to reduce social inequality, 25
strengthen communal conviviality, 26 and increase resident capacity for
collective action.27 All three of these goals can be expressed, in the
cost-benefit parlance that dominates policy discussions, as varieties of
social capital.28
20. See THOMAS D. D'ANDREA, TRADITION, RATIONALITY, AND VIRTUE: THE THOUGHT OF
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 425 (2006); MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 133.
21. See D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 425; MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 133; Mark C. Mur-
phy, Maclntyre's Political Philosophy, in ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 152, 170 (Mark C. Murphy ed.,
2003).
22. For Maclntyre's critique of the "emotivist culture" that he traces to the perceived success
and actual failure of the Enlightenment project, see MACINTYRE, supra note 15, 51-78
23. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 72-76 (1999); Amartya Sen, Capabilities
and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 34-35 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
24. See SEN, supra note 23, at 270; Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behav-
ioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326 (1977).
25. See infra Part II.B.1.
26. See infra Part II.B.2.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. Robert Putnam describes two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. The former
flows from and encourages close relationships. The latter deals with the connections between
persons of distinctly different backgrounds. Both play crucial roles in the success of civil society
that is so central to translating personal income into capabilities. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, Bow-
LING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22-24 (2000). For a
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In justifying the need for social equality at the neighborhood level,
proponents of CLTs need Sen's expansive understanding of cost-bene-
fit analysis. They must be able to empirically show how their strongly
"place-based" approach to community development delivers social
capital in all its dimensions.2 9 The community members themselves,
however, cannot rally one another to action with calls of "Optimal use
of in-kind subsidies!" Their vision for a just and prosperous neighbor-
hood must be animated by their own understanding of the creation of
justice as an indispensable part of human flourishing. The philosophi-
cal foundations of any community organization must seriously con-
sider the residents' interests and their ideals, as well as the shared
traditions that shaped them both.
In stewarding perpetually affordable homes and communal spaces
through nonprofit membership organizations, CLT members develop
and express their world view as they face important issues concerning
alienability of subsidized homes, collaboration with local government
in the control of communal spaces, and integration of shared interests
and ideals in self-governance. 30 In describing the localist economic
institutions needed to sustain community, MacIntyre draws upon an
account of authentic politics as a social practice that prizes awareness
of our inescapable interdependence and human vulnerability. 31 By in-
tegrating prudence-the quintessentially rational character trait for
many economists-with the other cardinal virtues of justice, modera-
tion, and courage, MacIntyre addresses the modern divide between
egoism and altruism, between self-interest and moral idealism. 32 He
completes his constructive vision with the capstone virtue of just gen-
description of a third type of social capital, referred to in this Article as "animating social capi-
tal," see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
29. Even among those who advocate for substantial proactive investment in order to reduce
socioeconomic inequality, there has been sharp disagreement as to how to focus resources.
"People-based" community development advocates direct subsidies to low-income households,
which frees them to improve their capacities and build wealth. Proponents of "place-based"
interventions press for investment in neighborhood revitalization and the empowerment of com-
munities. See Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place?: Revisiting the Who Versus
Where of Urban Development, 20 LAND LINES, July 2008, at 2, 4-7 (summarizing the cases for
and critiques of mobility and community-based strategies), available at http://www.community-
wealth.org/-pdfs/articies-publications/cross-sectoral/article-crane-manville.pdf (last visited on
October 28, 2009). Nestor Davidson has shown how the debate over budget priorities has over-
shadowed the complementarity of these positions. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People
and Place in Housing and Community Development, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1. 6-9
(2009).
30. See infra Part IV.A to IV.B.
31. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 129-31, 144-46.
32. See id. at 119; D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 380.
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erosity.33 This key virtue of acknowledged dependence addresses how
an organization that is dedicated to full social inclusion of the most
vulnerable people can hope to express the everyday interests of the
neighborhood as a whole. Sen's nuanced welfare economics gives
credibility to CLTs by demonstrating the policy significance of con-
served communities that act as "producers" of social capital.3 4 But
those who actively pursue neighborhood control of vital economic re-
sources can best understand their own work in Maclntyrean terms, as
creative resistance that conserves inclusive, attractive communities.
Drawing upon the actual struggles and achievements of inner-city
neighborhood residents, this Article shows that CLTs conserve urban
communities and sustain inclusive, creative neighborhoods in a man-
ner that reflects a uniquely neo-Aristotelian approach to economic de-
velopment, which in turn can guide CLTs in their critical policy
choices. Part II shows the ways in which CLTs contend with conven-
tional inner-city market dynamics in their community conservation ef-
forts, and it elicits the questions raised by CLTs' challenge to state and
market dominance of political economy at the neighborhood level.35
Part III of the Article examines the neo-Aristotelian thought of
Amartya Sen and Alasdair Maclntyre, and it argues that their work
provides respectively external and internal rationales for community
conservation institutions in a world divided between the market and
the state.36 The Article concludes by showing that a theoretical
awareness of the connection between human flourishing and local
communities might profitably inform the corporate and property rela-
tionships of inner-city neighborhoods that are involved in creating and
sustaining economically diverse communities of choice.
II. INNER-CITY COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS
Before exploring the thought of Sen and MacIntyre as they relate to
institutions that support the long-term community control of land re-
sources, it is important to show how CLTs are conserving inner-city
neighborhoods faced with the "creative destruction" 37 that is the dark
side of the neighborhood life-cycle. 38 These CLTs bear more than a
33. See MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 120; cf D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 379.
34. See infra notes 152-158, 167-169 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 38-123 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 124-243 and accompanying text.
37. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86
(6th ed. 1987) (discussing the concept of creative destruction).
38. See generally John T. Metzger, Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle The-
ory and National Urban Policy, 11 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 7 (2000) (analyzing the neighbor-
hood life cycle theory). But see generally Anthony Downs, Comment on John T. Metzger's
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distant historical relationship to the community organizing struggles
that brought an end to the Urban Renewal era. 39 Their resident foun-
ders came to their commitment to direct control of neighborhood land
through struggles against disinvestment, displacing development, and
environmental degradation. 40 The CLTs they created to secure and
build upon their hard-won gains reflect the same interests and ideals
that motivated these grassroots campaigns. The substance and pro-
cess of neighborhood-based land control, however, present issues very
different from the ones that animate popular struggles. Articulating
the need for a deeper understanding of the rationale for saving and
conserving these neighborhoods will set the stage for the exploration
of the social philosophies that can best justify and guide CLTs.
A. The Need for Community Control of Land Resources
As with other inner-city communities, the years following World
War II brought a massive demographic change to the Dudley Street
neighborhood in the Roxbury area of Boston. White residents moved
to suburbs, many of which were first established through racist lending
practices. 41 A cynical effort to promote African-American homeown-
ership in the late sixties caused more white flight and resulted in half
of the properties that had been sold to African-Americans, many at
inflated prices and unsustainable loan terms, being taken from them
through foreclosure and passed on to investors. 42 More than one ab-
sentee landlord solved the problem of declining property values by
"selling to the insurance company," a euphemism for arson.43 The
arson epidemic spawned vacant lots, making the neighborhood a tar-
get for illegal dumping of construction debris and other garbage.44 As
the environmental situation became completely intolerable, residents
"Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy", 11
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 41 (2000) (presenting counterarguments to Metzger's thesis).
39. The twenty-five years that followed the end of World War II witnessed the wholesale
destruction of many inner-city neighborhoods in the United States. See BERNARD FRIEDEN &
LYNNE SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. 133-47 (1990); GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 133-35 (1998).
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVITALIZING AMERICA'S FORGOTIEN NEIGHBORHOODS: AN INVESTI-
GATION OF INNER-CITY REVITALIZATION EFFORTS 70-72 (2000); (providing detailed demo-
graphic information for the Boston area for 1950-1990); MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at
14-16. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG-
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 49-51 (1993) (discussing studies that docu-
ment discriminatory real estate practices).
42. See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 25-27.
43. Id. at 30-32; BRIGHT, supra note 41, at 77 ("[M]ore than 20% of the [Dudley Street]
neighborhood had been denuded of buildings by arsonists in the 1960s.").
44. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 32-33.
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learned that the Boston Redevelopment Authority had designs to re-
make the neighborhood with minimal community input and signifi-
cant displacement effects.45 The arson, dumping, and threats of large-
scale dislocation that absentee landowners and city officials imposed
on the people of Dudley Street mobilized them to fight for a radically
different vision of their neighborhood's future.
Founded in 1985, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
(DSNI) focused on people and land, short-term crises and long-term
goals.46 Like many "people's organizations, '47 it used the indignity
and inescapability of the widespread dumping along Dudley Street to
galvanize the community around the need for change. The "Don't
Dump on Us" campaign resulted in the padlocking of several unli-
censed waste transfer lots as well as the beginning of an unlikely alli-
ance with then-Mayor Ray Flynn. 48 Having already defeated a
Boston Redevelopment Authority plan that would have caused dis-
placement of long-time residents, DSNI worked with surrounding
neighborhoods to secure the mayor's guarantee of community con-
trol-not mere consultation-over future redevelopment plans.49
DSNI built upon the enthusiasm engendered by the successes of its
antidumping campaign to create a community plan that incorporated
not only the residents' input but also their commitment to fighting for
its realization.50 In so doing, DSNI was able to move beyond the im-
mediate anger and short-term crises that typically dominate commu-
nity organizing agendas and foster a belief in the creation of social
justice.
45. Id. at 50-52.
46. Id. at 52-53.
47. SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 132 (Vintage Books 1969) (1946) ("A Peo-
ple's Organization is a conflict group .... Its sole reason for coming into being is to wage war
against all evils which cause suffering and unhappiness.").
48. See BRIGHT, supra note 41, at 80; accord MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 67-87. Ray
Flynn had made his political name in Boston by standing with those who opposed court-ordered
school desegregation. He drew upon his anti-busing background to defeat Mel King, a progres-
sive African-American veteran of the civil rights movement, in the primary election for the
Democratic nomination for mayor. See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 63-64.
49. See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 50-52, 89-91. For a discussion of the difference
between superficial and substantive community participation in local government planning ef-
forts, see Sherry R. Arnstein, Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation, in CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION: A CASE BOOK IN DEMOCRACY 335, 337-38 (Edgar S. Cahn & Barry Passett
eds., 1970); Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of
Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 870 & n.25 (2000).
50. See BRIGHT, supra note 41, at 80-81; MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 86-91.
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This vision was inspired as much by the calls of Martin Luther King
Jr. for economic justice 51 as by the more pragmatic counsel of Saul
Alinsky, father of the community organizing movement, who called
upon activists to organize around the problems identified by re-
sidents.52 King's vision of a "Beloved Community" in which people of
different races and classes lived and worked together to create justice
was and is undoubtedly utopian, 53 but for the people of Dudley Street,
it seemed no less attainable than a neighborhood that was not a crime-
ridden landfill. The residents' horrible experiences of absentee land
ownership and predatory real estate practices led them to make com-
munity control of land resources a priority during any development
process.
Through a focus on the land, the people of Dudley Street were able
to succeed where so many other community groups had failed after
successfully fighting city hall. They were able to sustain their enthusi-
asm from protest into the more drawn-out phases that lasting produc-
tivity requires. The community created a plan for development
without displacement. 54 They made community development history
by securing a delegation of eminent domain authority from the Bos-
ton Redevelopment Authority.55 The vacant lots that once repre-
sented disinvestment and environmental degradation became the
resources for the rebirth of the community. While maintaining the
traditional community organizing focus on the immediate needs of the
residents, DSNI's leadership employed control of land resources to
connect the collective long-term interests of residents to justice ideals.
The plan adopted by DSNI included two aspects of land trust work
that are essential to creating and sustaining economically diverse com-
munities of choice. First, new owner-occupied homes would be af-
fordable not just to the first homeowners, but to successive
51. For an examination of this underappreciated part of King's legacy, see generally TAYLOR
BRANCH, AT CANAAN'S EDGE: AMERICA DURING THE KING YEARS 1965-1968 (2006).
Anthony Cook has shown King's vision of the Beloved Community to be radically egalitarian.
See Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black
Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 974-76 (2000).
52. See ALINSKY, supra note 47, at 92-93. ("Only a fool would step into a community domi-
nated by materialistic standards and self-interest and begin to preach ideals .... [Community
organizing techniques] are the instruments used in preparing the scaffolding for the building of
an environment which will permit people to express their innate altruism."]
53. See Cook, supra note 51, at 974-76.
54. For an account of the work of David Nesbitt-a planning consultant with DAC Interna-
tional, which is a firm that was hired by DSNI-and a description of the plan that the community
created in 1987, see MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 99-113.
55. Id. at 122-125.
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generations of income-qualified households thereafter. 56 Second, the
plan pictured not just a safe, attractive bedroom community, but an
urban village that included shared common space, gardens, and busi-
ness activity that benefited the entire community.57 To secure both
these objectives, DSNI turned to the Community Land Trust model.
For the people of Dudley Street, the confluence of unbearable sanita-
tion conditions, encroaching development pressures from Boston's
city center, and a new mayor looking to mend fences created an op-
portunity to build a community-based organization that could succeed
in bringing significant investment into the community. The Commu-
nity Land Trust model allowed them to use those funds to facilitate
individual homeownership in a way that kept those subsidies in the
community.
In Los Angeles, the manner by which the community acquired the
affordable housing investment differed somewhat. The Figueroa Cor-
ridor Coalition for Justice comprises a variety of community organiza-
tions.58 While the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative has been
lauded for its unique use of governmental condemnation authority,
the Figueroa Corridor offers a prime example of the importance of a
community benefits agreement. 59 The opening of the Staples
Center-home to the Los Angeles Lakers-in 1999 was soon followed
by the announcement of a related large-scale commercial develop-
ment nearby.60 This for-profit development project required massive
public investment in land, building construction, and public infrastruc-
ture. Because of the importance of political support for the financing,
labor union involvement in both the creation of the project and the
business activity it would generate was absolutely essential. 61 The un-
ions' interest in the local communities as sources of members made
them sensitive to the impacts of these projects on the working families
56. See id. at 158-59.
57. Id. at 105-06.
58. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 315-17.
59. A community benefits agreement is "a negotiated agreement between community groups
and developers (or sometimes city agencies) that requires the delivery of specific benefits to
communities affected by the development project." Scott L. Cummings, The Emergence of
Community Benefits Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5, 5 (2008); accord
Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability, 17
J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 36-40 (2008); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine,
Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies
of Current and Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 113, 114
(2008).
60. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 316.
61. Local community organizations also used the threat of challenging the development deal
in environmental and land use administrative proceedings to gain critical leverage just before an
agreement was reached in May 2001. Id. at 317-21.
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of the nearby Figueroa Corridor.62 Although the community groups
alone lacked the political power to extract significant concessions
from the private investors or the city officials who backed the projects,
the neighborhood's alliance with labor unions gave the community
groups a strong, albeit limited, opportunity to make provision for af-
fordable housing, parking, job development, and open space in a for-
mal agreement; this agreement would be appended to the City's larger
agreement that established the public-private partnership behind the
development.63
Although the source of funds and the reason for governmental sup-
port were different in Los Angeles than they were in Boston, the need
to retain these gains within the community was just as strong. The
resident activists of the Dudley Street and Figureroa Corridor neigh-
borhoods could not look to the market or the local government to
preserve the affordable housing and public amenities gains that they
had won for their communities. To steward the inclusionary housing
and community space over the long-term, they needed an institution
that would endure as long as their cities. But in facing future resource
questions, they needed it to be just as accountable to local residents as
the campaigns that brought in the subsidies had been.
B. CLTs and Economically Diverse Communities of Choice
1. Perpetually Affordable Homes
CLTs develop affordable housing in much the same way as other
nonprofit community development corporations. A CLT provides
homes to economically disadvantaged people who are interested in
becoming community members by using a combination of donations,
grants, and public subsidies to reduce the cost of acquiring, develop-
ing, and marketing a decent single-family home. 64 Two of the inner-
city communities discussed in this Article have innovated the ways in
which they have obtained the support for their CLTs. The residents of
the Figueroa Corridor organized around the linkage opportunity that
the development by a large-scale, public-private partnership
presented. 65 The Community Benefits Agreement they signed pro-
62. Id. at 315.
63. Id. at 321-22. The full text of the terms of the community benefits agreement is available
at http://www.saje.net/atf/cf/%7B493B2790-DD4E-4EDO-8F4E-C78E8F3A7561 %7D/communi-
tybenefits.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
64. Like other community-based nonprofits, CLTs obtain both capital and operational fund-
ing from private foundations and federal programs that are administered by local governments,
such as Community Development Block Grants and the HOME Investment Partnership Pro-
gram. See DAVIS & JACOBUS, supra note 10, at 19-20.
65. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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vided that twenty percent of all the housing produced as part of the
development would be affordable to and set aside for the area's low-
and moderate-income residents who were displaced by the project. 66
The leaders of DSNI achieved a major victory in 1989 when they per-
suaded the Ford Foundation to lend Dudley Neighbors, Inc.-their
CLT-the remaining $2 million that it needed to exercise its eminent
domain authority and buy the privately owned vacant land in the
DSNI target area.67 Both DSNI and Figueroa Corridor wanted to
construct housing that would remain affordable as their communities
improved.
In a recent article, Lee Fennell demonstrates how the current resi-
dential land tenure options of rental and homeownership too fre-
quently limit the possibilities for fairness and efficiency among
community members.68 Outside of the very few jurisdictions that pro-
vide meaningful rent regulation, tenants have little or no security of
land tenure.69 Homeownership offers this long-term stability but only
to those who can afford the enormous capital investment required.70
Even most of those who are fortunate enough to buy a home must
invest an overwhelming percentage of their total wealth in a single,
undiversified asset that is subject to forces beyond their control.7'
Fennell proposes a market-oriented, shared equity financing model to
reduce the financial commitment a homeowner must make in order to
enjoy the use benefits of stable residential land tenure.72
In a similar manner, the CLT Homeownership model disaggregates
the investment and consumption aspects of homeownership. CLT
homeowners live in their homes in the same way as their neighbors
who bought on the market. They can stay in their homes indefi-
nitely.73 They can, with CLT consent, improve their properties.74
Their children or other heirs can inherit the home.7 5 They can acquire
66. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 321-22.
67. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 147-50.
68. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008).
69. See id. at 1054-56.
70. See id. at 1048, 1054.
71. See id. at 1055.
72. In referring to this equity partnership approach to housing affordability as "shared equity
financing" as opposed to "shared equity homeownership," I follow the terminology used by John
Davis. See DAVIs, supra note 10, at 5-6.
73. Although the CLT ground lease does not exceed ninety-nine years, most CLT leases allow
for a renewal of the lease at the option of the CLT homeowner. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON.,
supra note 10, at 13-4.
74. id. at 12-6 to 12-7.
75. Id. at 13-18 to 13-19.
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conventional financing for the purchase of their homes.76 They can,
like owners of market-purchased homes, build up equity that in-
creases their wealth. 77 But CLT homeownership differs from conven-
tional homeownership in two crucial ways.
In return for the opportunity to purchase a home that they could
not afford at market rate, household members purchasing a CLT
home make two promises to the Community Land Trust. First, they
pledge to occupy the property as their home during their ownership of
it.78 Second, the homeowners covenant that, when they decide to
move from the property, they will sell the home to another qualified
household at an affordable price. 79 The agreement between the CLT
and the homebuyer includes a formula that determines what the re-
sale price will be.8 0 The membership-elected directors of a CLT face
core policy decisions when crafting the resale formula that will be of-
fered to prospective CLT homebuyers.81 In setting the formula, CLTs
balance the homeowner's interest in a fair return on an important in-
vestment with the future homebuyer's need for affordability. Preserv-
ing affordability does not necessarily require the elimination of the
homeowner's equity appreciation. It is essential, however, that dra-
matic increases in real estate prices not destroy the opportunities for
future low- and moderate-income households to afford homeowner-
76. Id. at 10-1 to 10-2.
77. See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 102-06 (discussing a 2003 study of ninety-seven CLT home-
owner resales that showed widespread equity gains through amortization of mortgage principal
and share in home value appreciation).
78. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 1-11.
79. A CLT protects against full price market sale of a CLT home principally through a pre-
emptive option to purchase the property once the seller has declared the intent to transfer it. Id.
at 2-3, 13-21 to 13-23. Some states protect these efforts by allowing housing organizations to
create and enforce these restrictions as perpetual housing covenants. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 610 (2007) (authorizing the creation and enforcement of perpetual housing covenants).
However, most CLTs secure their ability to protect the affordability of the home by making the
preemptive option a provision in a ground lease of the property. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON.,
supra note 10, at 2-10, 13-21 to 13-23. For a review of the possible enforceability of these provi-
sions under the property law doctrines of invalid restraints against alienability and perpetuities,
see generally Abromowitz, supra note 10; Michael F. Keeley & Peter B. Manzo, Resale Restric-
tions and Leverage Controls, 1 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L., Spring 1992, at 9,
9-10; James J. Kelly, Jr., Homes Affordable for Good: Covenants and Ground Leases as Long-
Term Resale-Restriction Devices, 29 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1466388 (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
80. INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 2-1 to 2-3. As an alternative to a price-restric-
tive covenant, many nonprofit developers recoup some or all of the subsidy in cash upon resale
of the property. These subsidy recapture provisions discourage quick resale but do not necessa-
rily keep the particular subsidized property available to another income-qualified household. Id.
at 2-2; DAVIs, supra note 10, at 80-84.
81. For a discussion of the considerations of homeowner return and future affordability at
issue in establishing a resale formula, see DAVIs, supra note 10, at 64-69.
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ship. Resale formulas take a variety of approaches in balancing these
concerns.
Some CLTs seek to insure affordability by indexing equity apprecia-
tion to a general consumer purchasing power. For instance, the
amount by which a CLT homeowner's equity could appreciate might
be capped so as not to exceed increases in the local or national con-
sumer price index. 82 Likewise, a CLT might try to "lock in" af-
fordability by indexing equity appreciation to the increase in local
wages.83 This increase allows the homeowner's original monetary in-
vestment to keep pace with inflation, but not to grow significantly.
Other CLTs use the resale formula as an opportunity to allocate the
equity appreciation between the household and the community at
large. These CLTs might allow the homeowner to take twenty-five
percent or more of the total appreciation in equity.84 Another ap-
proach gives the homeowner the full appreciation value, but only on
the unsubsidized portion of the home value. 85
Like other providers of subsidized housing, CLT advocates must be
able to make the case for the dedication of public resources in order
to close the affordability gap. They must marshal arguments for social
as well as economic equality. As stewards of economically diverse
communities of choice, CLTs must also make the case for keeping all
or most of the subsidy in place rather than allowing qualified home-
owners to pocket it by selling the home on the open market or having
it repaid to the subsidy provider to have it recycled elsewhere. CLTs
cannot enter the arena of cost-benefit analysis to explain the value of
economically diverse communities of choice if the analysis focuses
only on aggregate income gains. They must be able to argue for the
indispensability of both the economic equality and the bridging social
capital that permanently affordable homes advance.
82. This is the approach that Dudley Neighbors, Inc. has taken with regard to the approxi-
mately two hundred homes it stewards. See Dudley Neighbors, Inc., Leaseholder Information
Resell Formula, http://www.dsni.org/DNIWebPages/pr02.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
83. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 66. The most common income-based CLT resale formula index is
the change in the Area Median Income.
84. Id. at 68. For example, suppose a CLT homeowner bought a house valued at $200,000 for
$120,000. If that same home was appraised at $560,000 ten years later when she decided to
move, then she could sell it for $210,000-the $120,000 she originally invested plus one-quarter
of the $360,000 increase in market value over ten years. Even such a modest increase in the cost
of the house might require some further subsidy by the CLT to make the house affordable to the
next generation of qualified homebuyers, whose incomes may not allow them to afford even
twenty-five percent of the increase in home prices. But by sharing the equity, CLTs can promote
economic opportunities over a wide spectrum and allow individual households to achieve their
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CLT proponents should also develop their own understanding of
their goals to sustain economically diverse communities of choice.
They must be able to balance the needs of both current and future
CLT homeowners. CLT homes offer their current homeowners secur-
ity of tenure and can also, depending on the resale formula, offer fi-
nancial gain that can enable educational and other beneficial
investments. Every dollar of original subsidy and equity appreciation
paid out will presumably increase the price of the property to the suc-
ceeding homeowners. 86 Developing an understanding of the trade-
offs involved will not lead to a one-size-fits-all resale formula. Too
many aspects of a CLT's particular real estate market come into play
to permit such a categorical response. The CLT members themselves
must strike the balance, and they may have to revisit the issue as con-
ditions change.
2. Neighborhood Spaces
The need for economically diverse neighborhoods and regions as
well as the supply of funds for affordable housing production has kept
CLTs focused on the creation of and stewardship over homes, particu-
larly single-family homes. CLTs have also been involved in develop-
ing community green spaces and other sites for resident interaction. 7
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative has created not only hous-
ing, but also public art and spaces for positive community action, and
it has involved the neighborhood youth in every aspect of the commu-
nity's growth.88 The environmental activism of DSNI's antidumping
campaign inspired grassroots efforts to create neighborhood greening
and cleaning programs under the banner of Dudley PRIDE.8 9 More
elaborate landscaping, farming, and art projects followed through
partnerships with the Massachusetts Horticultural Society, the Massa-
chusetts Audubon Society, and UrbanArts, among others. 90
While CLTs have been careful to protect community spaces from
aggressive private development, assertion of community control be-
86. Proponents of the CLT model frequently emphasize its efficiency in long-term subsidy
management by assuming that future affordability will be controlled by the resale formula alone.
See, e.g., DAVIS & JACOBUS, supra note 10, at 7-9. The preemptive option allows the CLT to buy
down the price of its property through the investment of an additional subsidy.
87. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
88. See MEDOFF AND SKLAR, supra note 7, at 181-82, 220-24.
89. Id. at 179-81.
90. Id. at 182-83. Projects on land owned by Dudley Neighbors, Inc. include a local play-
ground, a community garden, an orchard, and a large greenhouse. See Dudley Neighbors, Inc.,
Open Space Projects, http://www.dsni.org/DNI-Web-Pages/services.htm (last visited Aug. 22,
2009).
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comes even more important for land that no one seems to want. It
may first appear that a community's struggle to gain control of land
resources makes sense only when private developers, either directly or
through local government development officials, are poised to take it
from them. Inner-city communities battling chronic disinvestment,
however, are claiming key pieces of vacant land in their neighbor-
hoods so that drug-dealing and other criminal activity do not take
root.9' Both the Time of Jubilee CLT92 in Syracuse, New York and
Charm City Land Trusts93 in Baltimore, Maryland have converted va-
cant lots to community gardens that encourage the young people in
the neighborhoods to grow produce and seek solace. Like their coun-
terparts in Boston, the residents of the southwest section of Syracuse
have used the vacant lots left by abandoned house demolitions not
only as sites for new construction but also as spaces to grow food.
They have launched the Urban Delights Youth Farmstand Project to
engage young people to work the land as urban farmers. 94 The Amaz-
ing Grace Lutheran Church and the residents of the McElderry Park
neighborhood have worked to transform a crime-ridden block in East
Baltimore into a spiritual oasis, complete with an embedded stone lab-
yrinth that facilitates meditation. 95 The effect on that community has
been quiet but profound. Drug dealers have moved on, and their cus-
tomers who still pass through now respect the attractiveness of the
space.96
Certainly, CLTs did not invent the small neighborhood park, and
many local governments have community gardening programs, some
of which use lots resulting from house demolitions. 97 The subsidies
91. Often cited research has shown that visible signals of disorder, such as abandoned houses
and vacant lots, can spur further disorder and that seemingly superficial investments in neighbor-
hood appearance can lead to more substantive community improvements. See James Q. Wilson
& George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32. For statistical evidence that community gardens produce
positive externalities that affect neighboring property values, see generally Vick Been & loan
Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL EST. ECON.
241 (2008).
92. See Jubilee Homes of Syracuse, Inc., Urban Delights Youth Farmstand Project, http://
www.jubilee-homes.org/Urban%20Delights.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
93. The author is a founding board member of Charm City Land Trusts, Inc. For more infor-
mation about Charm City Land Trusts, Inc., see Charm City Land Trusts, http://
www.parksandpeople.org/cclt/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
94. See Jubilee Homes of Syracuse, Inc., supra note 92; Metro Voices, http://blog/syra-
cuse.com/metrovoices/index.html (July 23, 2008, 2:26 EST).
95. See Anne Raver, Public Spaces Meant to Heal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at D7.
96. Id.
97. See Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local
Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 373-90 (2000).
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available for community gardening and passive recreation are signifi-
cantly smaller than those available for housing development. In the
context of neighborhood spaces, the issue for justifying CLT owner-
ship is not the need to invest, but rather who should control the land.
Jane Schukoske has documented a number of municipal programs
that support community-controlled creative greening activities on
publicly owned land.98 While these collaborations last, there may be
very little disagreement between community and municipal partners
over the proper use of the land. Schukoske has also documented,
however, that municipal administrations can change direction and un-
dercut creative efforts.99 In 1998, then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani exer-
cised the contractual right of the City of New York to cancel dozens of
GreenThumb garden leases on lots that he wished to make available
for private auction to housing developers. 100 Although a subsequent
lawsuit failed to garner an injunction against the City's auction, two
newly formed land trusts succeeded in purchasing many, but not all of
the lots at issue.101 The experience in New York has caused other
urban greening organizations to prioritize the acquisition of legal con-
trol over the land to which they dedicate themselves. For example,
the church members and residents behind Baltimore's Amazing Port
Street Sacred Commons worked with local foundations to acquire
more than $40,000 to purchase the space.10 2 At the same time, they
partnered with Charm City Land Trusts, Inc. to acquire title to the
different rowhouse lots that make up the site. 10 3
C. CLTs and Democratic Governance
In both their commitment to permanently affordable homeowner-
ship and common spaces as permanent fixtures of their particular
communities, neighborhood-based CLTs exhibit an interesting blend
98. See id.
99. Id. at 386-88; accord Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137,
190-91 (2008); see also ADAM BLOCK, PARKS & PEOPLE FOUNDATION, NEIGHBORHOOD OPEN
SPACE MANAGEMENT: COMMUNITY GREENING SURVEY AND LAND TRUST STRATEGIES FOR
BALTIMORE CITY 3 (2003), available at http://www.parksandpeople.org/cclt/pdf/community-
green-report.pdf (stating that in 1995 the City of Baltimore had evicted previously authorized
community gardeners so that the land could be converted into a parking lot).
100. See Lehavi, supra note 99, at 191; Schukoske, supra note 97, at 386.
101. See Lehavi, supra note 99, at 191; Schukoske, supra note 97, at 386-88.
102. Raver, supra note 95.
103. See BLOCK, supra note 99, at 22; accord Charm City Land Trusts, Inc., Amazing Port
Street Community Green, http://www.parksandpeople.org/cclt/webpages/amazing-port-cs.html
(last visited Aug. 22, 2009). Charm City Land Trusts, Inc., with legal assistance from the students
and attorneys of the University of Baltimore Community Development Clinic, has secured clear
title to more than ninety percent of the site.
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of partisanship and idealism. Both the Dudley Street and Figueroa
Corridor residents did not just express a willingness to improve their
communities, but they also actively fought for the resources and politi-
cal authority to make affordable housing and community amenities a
reality. They did so in the context of economic growth that made
these investments feasible, but their strategies for acquiring the neces-
sary funds inevitably put them in competition with other neighbor-
hoods that sought resources for improvement. This concentration of
limited resources is even more striking in communities such as Syra-
cuse where the public investments being made are taking place not in
the context of growth, but in continuing economic retraction. 10 4
While there is no apology made for the particularism inherent in this
localist advocacy, the CLT approach also tempers this partisanship,
sustained by a democratic structure, with openness to the needs of
vulnerable members of society at large and attention to the needs of
future generations.
The classic CLT governance structure consists of a tripartite board
of directors that is elected by the membership of the CLT. Residents
of CLT homes are automatically members of the organization, but an-
yone can become a member of the CLT.10 5 The resident members
nominate and elect one-third of the board with another third being
named and elected by the non-resident members. 10 6 Nominations for
the remaining seats are provided by the Board and are voted upon by
the entire membership as a whole. 10 7 In this way, the governance
structure guarantees direct representation on the board to CLT home-
owners and to other community members invested in the CLT. The
CLT board itself also has the opportunity to seek out other people as
directors, perhaps outside the neighborhood, who might help advance
the CLT's mission.
The classic board structure has been modified to fit the needs of the
various communities using the CLT model. Dudley Neighbors, Inc. is
a corporate subsidiary of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initia-
tive. 10 8 The majority of its twelve members are appointed by DSNI, at
least one of whom must be a CLT property resident. 109 The majority
of the DSNI board is directly elected by its resident membership-
104. MATTHEW P. DRENNAN, ROLF PENDALL & SUSAN CHRISTOPHERSON, TRANSITION AND
RENEWAL: THE EMERGENCE OF A DIVERSE UPSTATE ECONOMY 3-4 (2004), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/reports/2004/Oldemographics-pendall.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
105. INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 5-13.
106. Id. at 5-19 to 5-21.
107. Id.
108. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 126-27.
109. Id..
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more than 3,500 strong at last count.110 The bylaws of Charm City
Land Trusts, Inc. permit partnering community-based organizations to
become members of the Community Land Trust and to elect their own
representatives, who comprise a minority of the organization's
board.11
In many ways, CLTs deploy the same kind of legal tools as home-
owner associations (HOAs) and other kinds of common interest com-
munity associations. HOAs frequently hold full legal title to parking
areas, common green spaces, and community amenities.112 They also
enforce use restrictions and, less frequently, transfer restrictions on
the private parcels owned by their members.11 3 Michael Heller has
described HOAs and other common interest developments as mixing
elements of commons and anticommons ownership.11 4 They avoid the
tragedies of the commons and anticommons varieties through govern-
ance.115 Corporate boards that are democratically elected by the
property owners take responsibility for the management of shared
spaces and administration of restrictive covenants.11 6 The governance
structure of these associations facilitates the effective decision making
that is so crucial to avoiding both dissipation and gridlock.1 17 The lim-
its they impose on use and development are designed to stabilize the
resident owners' expectations of the built environment.118 The HOA
property is shared, but its use is generally restricted to its members.1 19
HOA members open their common spaces to outsiders when and to
the extent that it suits their collective interests.
110. Id.; Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, DSNI Historic Timeline, http://
www.dsni.org/timeline.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
111. See Charm City Land Trusts, Inc., Amended Bylaws 3, 6 (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file with
author). These bylaws reflect the author's previous experience in helping to found the New
Columbia Community Land Trust in Washington, DC in 1990.
112. See Clayton Gillette, Courts, Covenants and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1382
(1994).
113. Id. at 1383-84.
114. See Michael A. Heller, Common Interest Development at the Crossroads of Legal Theory,
37 URB. LAW. 329, 329, 331 (2005).
115. Just as the tragedy of the commons is associated with overuse and underinvestment due
to overlapping rights of use, the tragedy of the anticommons yields underuse and underinvest-
ment because overlapping rights of exclusion create gridlock. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION
AND COSTS LIVES 1-3 (2008). See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (articulat-
ing the theory of the tragedy of the anticommons).





As nonprofit membership corporations, CLTs also employ demo-
cratic governance to sustain balance in their affirmative and negative
control of land resources. As charitable entities, however, they add
yet another dimension to this already complex approach to property
ownership. Because even small CLTs serve large and less privatized
spaces, their attempts to improve the lives of their community mem-
bers have a broad public purpose on scale alone. But CLTs differ
from HOAs not only in the size of their constituencies but in the na-
ture of their goals. CLTs are committed to social welfare purposes
that cannot be reduced to the aggregation of their members' individ-
ual interests. Specifically, their organizational documents commit
them to providing housing for low- and moderate-income persons. 120
A purely partisan community organization is free to pursue any and
all of the collective interests of the resident members. A CLT does
not merely focus its efforts on long-term collective needs but also ele-
vates its goals to provide for those whose needs are most likely to be
neglected by market activities in the neighborhood. Although demo-
cratically controlled, the CLT structure as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) or-
ganization challenges, and to some extent requires, its resident
constituents to act as trustees for the resources that have been trusted
to it.
In connecting with outside groups and institutions, the activists be-
hind CLTs need to communicate both their interests and their ideals.
In asserting their goals in the hurly-burly of city politics, neighbor-
hood activists must be able to demonstrate that significant numbers of
constituents are resolved to fight for their interests. In approaching
public and private investors, however, community-based development
advocates must also show that the plans they have formed make good
policy sense. DSNI has demonstrated its success in both these areas.
DSNI not only forced the City to end illegal dumping in their neigh-
borhood, it also secured an extraordinary delegation of eminent do-
main authority to Dudley Neighbors, Inc., its CLT.121 Its subsequent
community development accomplishments have made it a point of ref-
erence for any discussion about increasing social capital in inner-city
neighborhoods. 122 But the very success in bringing people together
has come from the engagement of residents in the creation of a com-
munity that is not only vibrant but also just. The empowerment of the
residents of Dudley Street can be described from the outside as a
120. See INST. FOR CMTe. ECON., supra note 10, at 6-3 to 6-8.
121. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
122. See SIMON, supra note 8, at 67-68; Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarian-
ism: Toward a Community-Based Social Welfare System, 66 U. PIrr. L. REV. 721, 790-93 (2005).
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growth in social capital. 123 But a creative, activist spirit cannot be sus-
tained through an internal process that focuses on cost-benefit analy-
sis, even one that embraces community-friendly metrics. Such a
broadened public policy framework benefits discourse between the
community and external institutions rather than within the community
organization itself. The fight to prevent a deteriorated community
from being discarded altogether may, in fact, preserve and produce a
certain quantum of social capital. Moreover, the recognition of this
cost-benefit factor may lead those outside the neighborhood to recon-
sider the significance of its struggle for survival. The residents' own
understanding of their communal life, however, cannot be so objec-
tive. The very passion that creates their cohesion flows from their
commitment to the ideals, needs, hopes, and dreams shared among
the community members themselves.
III. WHY NEIGHBORHOOD LAND AND COMMUNITY MATTER
The previous Part of this Article illustrates how CLTs allow commu-
nities to perpetuate themselves through market upheavals. Certainly,
CLTs such as Dudley Neighbors, Inc., the Figueroa Corridor CLT, and
the Time of Jubilee CLT are sustaining economically diverse commu-
nities with strong social cohesion. But to fully understand the value of
the substantial public investments into these efforts, we must place in
a social, political, and economic framework the struggle against the
problems of social deterioration and displacement caused by both dis-
investment and gentrification. The focus on the importance of devel-
oping communities not only challenges particular development
strategies but many of the assumptions underlying conventional eco-
nomic theory. An evaluative framework that is restricted to house-
hold income maximization will identify some asset-building benefits of
sustaining economic diversity, but it will miss many others. 124 Policies
based on such a narrow view of economic improvement will contort
123. The sustaining of community within inner-city neighborhoods that CLTs foster can be
described in cost-benefit terms as three different types of social capital. Through the creation of
perpetually affordable homes, CLTs secure economic equality and produce bridging social capi-
tal. By providing for community-controlled common spaces, CLTs foster bonding social capital.
In their democratic governance structure, CLTs seek to sustain the collective commitment and
drive to community transformation that brought the resources to their community. I call this
purpose-driven civic engagement "animating social capital."
124. Most of these overlooked gains can be accounted for as some form of social capital. See
supra note 123; see also David Brooks, Op-Ed, Edwards, Obama and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2007, at A19 (noting the author's preference for then-Senator Obama's emphasis on neigh-
borhood revitalization over Senator Edwards' plan because the former appeared to value social
capital more).
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community development efforts to the detriment of sustainable social
development.
Before further exploring the issues involved in restricted-resale
homeownership, community control of neighborhood spaces, and the
decision making structure of CLTs, it is necessary to develop the theo-
retical resources that might be brought to bear. Certain neo-Aristote-
lian approaches offer an alternative to the modernist dichotomy of
state and market. 125 Even as they offer new ways forward, drawing
upon the latest developments in understanding human behavior, they
also invite us to look back and reclaim a wholeness of thought that has
been lost in the compartmentalization that so thoroughly character-
izes modern thinking. 126 Amartya Sen shows that a desire for exact-
ingly clear and quantifiable economic measures has led welfare
economists to discount essential aspects of the improvement of quality
of life. 127 His work orients economists, who are ordinarily focused on
the aggregation of myriad individual prudential decisions, toward an
appreciation of the conscious interdependence of a society's mem-
bers.128 Alasdair Maclntyre diagnoses a more fundamental failing in
modern thinking and abandons hopes that large-scale markets or gov-
ernments will ever produce coherent progress.12 9
Maclntyre believes that only community-based institutions can
properly sustain the networks of giving and receiving that are so es-
sential to his vision of a truly just polity.130 Sen broadens welfare eco-
nomics to account for growth in social capital and the availability of
public goods that are essential to quality of life.131 This move levels
the policy playing field to allow proponents of community-focused in-
125. Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Pefialver recognize a wide diversity of approaches to
the centrality of community in property law. See Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 1, at 129
(such theories include those "that have gone under the names of 'communitarian,' 'liberal com-
munitarian,' 'republican,' 'civic republican,' and even certain theories that have simply called
themselves 'liberal').
126. Sen blames a modernist preoccupation with behavioral prediction for this impoverish-
ment of description. "Focusing only on predicting behaviour, the richness of human psychology
has been substantially ignored, refusing to see anything in utility or happiness other than
choice." AMARTYA SEN, Description As Choice, reprinted in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASURE-
MENT 432, 442 (1982).
127. See SEN, supra note 23, at 54-63, 67-76.
128. See id. at 272-81; infra notes 138-162 and accompanying text.
129. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 62-78 (linking the development of emotivism to the
rise of the bureaucratic manager as a modern ideal); MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 131-33, 145
(explaining why nation-states cannot foster an authentic political life, arguing that a politics com-
mitted to the common good must reject consumer capitalism); infra notes 177, 226-229 and
accompanying text.
130. MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 129-46 (rejecting nation-state and family as institutional
homes for the practice of politics); see infra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
131. SEN, supra note 23, at 71, 127-29.
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vestments to prove their case. 132 MacIntyre constructs a political the-
ory that puts community-controlled institutions at the very center.133
But to understand why we should consider either a moderate or radi-
cal embrace of community-controlled land resources over a com-
pletely privatized real estate market, we should first turn our attention
to Sen's critique of the contemporary preoccupation with total income
and the promotion of self-interested behavior that supposedly in-
creases it.
A. Sen: Community Support as Sound Public Policy
Welfare economists broadly recognize that markets, when function-
ing properly, will tend to price goods and services to achieve optimal
utility.134 Sen, however, separates the powerful arguments that sup-
port freedom of exchange from the libertarian claims that prosperity
depends largely, if not entirely, on unfettered access to markets. 35 As
an advocate of economic freedom, Sen has urged his fellow welfare
economists to "expand the information base" by which they evaluate
economic success.' 36 Instead of focusing exclusively on maximizing
income through unfettered market access, he invites policymakers to
expand their view to encompass the growth of individual freedoms, by
which he means access to commodity baskets and capabilities to func-
tion as persons. 137
With regard to conventional economics' translation of the good into
preferences expressed as demand strength, Sen urges an expansion of
the information base by which goods are evaluated. 38 Instead of util-
132. See infra notes 152-58 and 169-70 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Part III.B.
134. The Arrow-Debreu theorem states that, given a broad range of ideal conditions, markets
in general equilibrium will create a system that cannot be improved upon without decreasing the
utility of at least one person. See SEN, supra note 23, at 117. A state of affairs that can be
improved upon only to the detriment of at least one affected person is said to be Pareto optimal.
See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE 213 (1984) The authors give an example of a world with only two persons
and one desirable commodity of which there is only ten units. Any initial distribution of that
commodity between the two would be Pareto optimal because no redistribution or transfer could
improve one person's utility without decreasing the other person's. Id.
135. SEN, supra note 23, at 70-74 (showing that the translation of income into well-being
depends on a variety of non-economic circumstances).
136. Id. at 63.
137. Higher incomes do not necessarily translate into increases in substantive welfare indices
such as life-expectancy. Countries such as Brazil, however, have increased per capita income
without raising life expectancy comparably. Other countries have been able to increase life ex-
pectancy even though economic indicators have remained stagnant by comparison. Id. at 45-47.
138. Id. at 62-63, 67-76 (showing the "capabilities" approach to be more comprehensive than
a purely income metric). When conventional development experts identify the poor as those
who fail to maintain a certain income, they focus on a proxy value that misses a variety of
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ity, translated as income,139 being the marker by which economic effi-
ciency is judged, Sen argues that the fostering of individuals'
substantive freedoms should serve as the basis for judging the quality
of economic structures. 140 Personal freedom should be looked at in
terms of an individual's prospects for being able to function as a per-
son and the individual's ability to acquire goods that support human
functionings.14
As with conventional definitions, Sen's understanding of freedom
centers on a person's unencumbered ability to choose. However, the
mere number of available options is meaningless if the alternatives are
all equally unappealing. As Sen writes, "It is odd to conclude that the
freedom of a person is no less when she has to choose between three
alternatives which she sees respectively as 'bad', 'awful', and 'grue-
some' than when she has the choice between three alternatives which
she assesses as 'good', 'excellent', and 'superb." 142 Implicit in Sen's
point is an appreciation for the role that individual and societal limita-
tions play in shaping actual freedom, as distinguished from theoretical
freedom. 43
To accommodate a more robust understanding of opportunity with-
out rendering empirical analysis completely unworkable, Sen offers
the linked concepts of "functionings" and "capabilities." Functionings
are essentially elements of human flourishing. They are modes of do-
ing and being that human beings generally embrace as contributing to
a life. 144 They can include extremely important aspects of living, such
as adequate nourishment or the ability to speak out on political issues
of personal significance.145 Likewise, they can include trivial things as
important factors relevant to the elimination of needless suffering and the promotion of basic
equality. As Aristotle recognized, monetary wealth cannot be the sole focus of any rigorous
evaluative exercise because it has no intrinsic value and is useful only insofar as it allows the
holder to secure something else. Id. at 14 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence
Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999)).
139. Id. at 69.
140. Id. at 72-76.
141. Functionings can range from the highly personal and sometimes trivial-for example,
using a particular brand of laundry detergent-to the basic and indispensable. Sen's Aristotelian
approach supports an acknowledgment of basic functionings that are independent of the market
demand for them. For a list of these components of basic well-being, see Robert Erikson, De-
scriptions of Inequality: The Swedish Approach to Welfare Research, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE,
supra note 23, at 67, 68 tbll.
142. Sen, supra note 23, at 34-35.
143. The libertarian may point to the possibility of a determined market participant working
to expand her options from the first set to include those in the second, more attractive grouping,
but Sen would insist on attention to the likely outcomes for such an investment of effort. Id.
144. Id. at 31.
145. Id. at 75.
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well. 146 Sen defines the capabilities of people as those functionings
that are available to them. More precisely, Sen defines a capability as
a set of functionings that a person could choose. Capability, then, em-
bodies the notion of the ability to choose among different ways of
well-being and not just the kind of well-being that, by some standard,
is considered optimal. 147 As implied in his quote in the foregoing par-
agraph, Sen contends that a full accounting of the importance of
someone's capabilities, as compared with functionings still out of
reach, cannot be judged apart from knowledge of the person's own
values. 148 Nevertheless, "basic capabilities," those indispensable to
more discretionary functionings, can be generically identified, even if
their relative priority may vary considerably among different socie-
ties.149 Informally, he lists some of them: "The ability to move about
... the ability to meet one's nutritional requirements, the wherewithal
to be clothed and sheltered, [and] the power to participate in the so-
cial life of the community. 150 Basic capabilities such as these are the
focal point for Sen's egalitarianism. 151 Just as "freedom," defined in
terms of capabilities, substitutes for "utility" in Sen's welfare econom-
ics, basic capabilities take the place of unfettered access to markets in
Sen's presentation of equality of opportunity.
The fundamental significance that Sen attaches not only to shelter
but also to social inclusion can support public investment in the crea-
tion and sustenance of economically diverse communities of choice.'5 2
A growing sociological literature has documented the debilitating ef-
146. Sen refers to an example from Bernard Williams of using a particular brand of laundry
detergent. Id. at 32.
147. Id. at 38.
148. Martha Nussbaum rejects relativism with regard to prioritizing functionings. See Martha
Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra
note 23, at 242, 246-47. Sen maintains that nothing in the capabilities approach itself requires
such a universalist approach. See Sen, supra note 23, at 47.
149. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT, supra
note 126, at 353, 367-68.
150. Id. at 367.
151. Sen argues that basic fairness requires equality of some sort but that the interesting ques-
tion is what should be considered equal. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12-19
(1992).
152. Because Sen, along with his collaborator Martha Nussbaum, has become so prominent in
the theory of international development, it may seem that he is addressing only the most ex-
treme deprivations of housing and dignity. Sen has made it clear, however, that he believes
poverty should be measured relative to a society's standard of living. See AMARTYA SEN, Poor,
Relatively Speaking, in RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 325 (Harvard Univ. Press
1997) (1984) (relative deprivation with regard to income, commodities, and resources leads to
non-relative deprivation with regard to capabilities).
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fects caused by geographic concentration of poverty.153 Neighbor-
hoods hold the key to elementary, and often secondary, public
education opportunities.' 54 Some authors have decried how extreme
segregation reinforces antisocial, destructive behavioral patterns with
regard to work, education, and gender roles that undermine child de-
velopment and education. 55 Some community development experts
have used these observations to advocate for creating exit strategies
for those who wish to "escape" poverty by moving out of poor neigh-
borhoods. 56 But Sen's emphasis on capabilities does not dictate an
everyone-for-herself approach alone. Relocation out of public hous-
ing has not universally yielded social inclusion. 157 Mobility strategies
often aggravate the isolation of those that remain behind.158 Bridging
social capital can be lost by those who move and those who remain.
Advocates of place-based strategies need not argue for constraining
motivated residents of low-income neighborhoods from moving. But
when a community as a whole indicates its commitment to raising the
quality of life for the neighborhood as a whole, Sen's inclusion of so-
cial capital metrics and his emphasis on the needs of the most de-
prived provide ample justification for place-based development as
sound public policy. Moreover, his belief in the prospects for social
equality flows from his less individualistic account of personal decision
making.
153. See generally PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY (1997) ("Residents of high-poverty areas have lower labor force participation,
higher unemployment, more part-time jobs, and lower wages than residents of other neighbor-
hoods, yet they receive approximately the same proportion of their total income from wages and
tend to work in the same industries as other neighborhoods"); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
41 (examining concentration of poverty in African-American inner-city neighborhoods as the
legacy of continuing racial segregation in American metropolitan areas); WILLIAM JULIUS WIL-
SON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
20-62 (1987) (exploring sociological factors associated with chronic poverty of African-Ameri-
can inner-city residents).
154. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 41, at 141 ("The organization of public schools around
geographical catchment areas ... reinforces and exacerbates the social isolation that segregation
creates in neighborhoods.").
155. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 41, at 140-41 ("Because welfare receipt, unwed
childbearing, and marital disruption are strongly associated with poverty, they are concentrated
by any structural process that geographically concentrates poverty."); WILSON, supra note 153, at
21 (listing "black crime, teenage pregnancy, female-headed families, and welfare dependency" as
factors in "the tangle of pathology in the inner-city").
156. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 41, at 229-32 (calling for "[d]ismantling the
[g]hetto").
157. See LARRY ORR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV., MOVING TO OPPORTU-
NITY: INTERIM IMPACTS EVALUATION viii-ix (2003), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
MTOFullReport.pdf.
158. See Davidson, supra note 29, at 7.
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Free market advocates' primary argument against imposed substan-
tive equality centers on the burdens that the necessary redistribution
efforts would impose on economic efficiency and aggregate prosper-
ity. Essential to their arguments against enforced equity is the pre-
mise that unobstructed self-interested behavior spontaneously orders
resources for optimal efficiency.' 5 9 Adam Smith is often cited to ex-
plain how self-interest unexpectedly produces social benefits:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their
self-love .... 160
By pursuing their own wants, citizens develop productive enter-
prises that complement one another and raise welfare overall. 161 Sen,
however, states that the depiction of rational choice as fundamentally
self-serving is an unrealistic account of human motivation and incon-
sistent with Smith's views.162
Sen demonstrates that the very important self-regarding motivation
of prudence is supplemented by sympathy and commitment.163 Sym-
pathy explains actions that people are naturally inclined to take even
though it is not consistent with their personal advantage, at least not
in a narrowly defined sense.1 64 Commitment refers to decisions that
people make in the interests of others even though it goes against
both their self-interests and their inclinations. 65 When we take the
time to help others, not for the hope of recompense or a boost in
social standing but because we derive personal relief from lessening
their suffering, we act out of sympathy for them.166 Our happiness,
not diminished from our investment, is actually increased to a degree
that often exceeds the gain from any other activity that we could have
159. See F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 96-105 (1967).
(emphasizing the power of unintended consequences of human action in social theory)
160. SEN, supra note 23, at 256 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26-27 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976)). Later
on in The Wealth of Nations, Smith animates the contractarian reciprocity that makes seemingly
anti-social characteristics so widely beneficial, writing that the market participant is "led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." Id. (quoting SMITH, supra,
at 456).
161. Sen does not reject the idea that our acts-both self-interested and selfless-can have
unintended, if not unforeseeable, consequences. He does, however, take issue with the implica-
tion that all publicly minded economic planning is doomed to frustration and failure. Cf. SEN,
supra note 23, at 254-57.
162. Id. at 270-72.
163. Id.; Sen, supra note 24, at 326.
164. See SEN, supra note 23, at 270; Sen, supra note 24, at 326.
165. See SEN, supra note 23 at 270-71.
166. Id. at 327.
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done instead. In this sense, these actions are both other-regarding and
efficient in maximizing personal utility. We are better off even though
our actions cannot be explained by self-interest alone, at least not by a
narrow definition of self-interest that makes sympathy irrelevant.
But sympathy cannot account for all other-regarding behavior,
some of which clearly goes beyond personal happiness and clearly in-
volves self-sacrifice. Sen describes committed behavior as that which
people undertake to further their ideals. 167 In developing moral prin-
ciples, we understand that we may be called upon to make sacrifices
for those we do not know or those we do know but with whom we
have no emotional connection at all.168 An account of human action
that claims that anyone who acts to further an ideal without taking
some pleasure in the act simply fails to describe a large part of public-
minded activity. A society benefits when social capital makes it possi-
ble for relationships among community members to be robust enough
to have community-supporting activities encouraged by both sympa-
thy and commitment. Trust and the ability to work cooperatively are
important to business transactions that facilitate growth in private
wealth, but they are absolutely indispensable to the creation and ef-
fective distribution of public goods, such as healthcare, education,
parks, and other shared space amenities. Social capital is crucial to
and can be in turn increased by small-scale collaborative projects to
keep land available for community needs. By dedicating land to per-
manently affordable homeownership, CLTs sustain economic diversity
among residents that is crucial to bridging social capital. By protect-
ing community space for community activities that displace nuisance
uses, CLTs contribute to bonding social capital. By engaging residents
in the stewardship of the land, CLTs also foster a type of social capital
that is not adequately classified as bridging or bonding social capital.
The commitment of community members to collective action on be-
half of the ideals and the interests protected by the CLT represents
"animating social capital. '' 169 CLTs cannot inspire this dedication,
however, by talking to its members about the statistical gains from
increased social capital of any kind. To guide CLTs in their own vi-
sioning processes, proponents need to move beyond cost-benefit anal-
yses to a richer understanding of practical reasoning.
167. See id. at 336-37.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 124. Putnam recognizes the "new identities and extend[ed] social net-
works" that are formed by people engaged in grassroots struggles that they regard as just. He
questions whether such benefits accrue to members of institutionally driven movements. See
PUTNAM, supra note 28, at 153.
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B. Maclntyre: Community Conservation as Essential to
Human Flourishing
Sen has moved welfare economics in a neo-Aristotelian direction by
focusing its attention on the basic components of the quality of life
and by showing that income alone does not offer an adequate mea-
surement of prosperity. Sen's understanding of freedom as the goal
and the means of development particularizes human flourishing. So
conceived, freedom inevitably requires personal dignity, social capital,
and the broad satisfaction of basic human needs, none of which are
guaranteed by functioning markets alone. Sen's more nuanced cost-
benefit analysis nevertheless sees human capabilities primarily as a
means of satisfying personal needs and wants.
Departing more radically from instrumentalism in human develop-
ment, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the distinctively human mode of
discerning and acting for our own good is not only the way to human
flourishing but also is itself a central part of flourishing. 170 It is not
enough that we are more successful than other animals in satisfying
our desires; to flourish, we must become independent practical rea-
soners.171 As human beings, we develop not only the ability to have
reasons for actions but also the capacity to reflect on those reasons for
actions and fit them into larger understandings of our life projects. 172
This growth in practical reasoning necessarily takes place within one
or more communities.1 73 As children, we learn from others what con-
stitutes our good.174 MacIntyre emphasizes that a person's mature un-
derstanding of her good inevitably connects her to a community's
conception of the common good.1 75 Only a society that promotes ho-
listic human development both for its own sake as well as for the ma-
terial success it yields can hope to thrive.' 76 In the absence of
meaningful moral discourse, 77 however, the market and the state sus-
170. See MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 67 ("Human beings need to learn to understand them-
selves as practical reasoners about goods, about what on particular occasions it is best for them
to do and how it is best for them to live out their lives.").
171. Id.
172. Id. at 69 ("The small child, if possible, acts on its desires, finding in them reasons for
actions, as dolphins do, as gorillas do. What the use of language enables it to achieve is ... the
evaluation of its reasons.").
173. See D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 377-78.
174. Id. at 376.
175. See MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 107-09.
176. See KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 156.
177. A full exploration of Maclntyre's critique of contemporary moral and political thought is
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that by jettisoning particular moral traditions
in favor of universal mandates, modern moral philosophy has contributed to a political discourse
characterized by endless conflict over competing interests that are articulated as rights and the
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tain themselves through bureaucratic manipulation.1 78 Maclntyre ar-
gues that a society that enables acquisitiveness does not free its
members but instead prevents their authentic development.1 79 To re-
pair the modernist breach, MacIntyre proposes a craft-based ethic in
which life-sustaining social practices reveal guiding values through
their own internal logic.
Fundamental to MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is the
concept of a "practice." A practice is a set of shared, skilled activities
that provides internal goods as well as external goods.180 MacIntyre
offers a trawler crew catching fish as an example of a group engaged
in a practice. 8" The crew members work together in order to get fish
for personal consumption and sale, but in doing so they also grow in
their mastery of the skills involved in good fishing.18 2 Effective fishing
produces benefits readily identified as external goods. The caught fish
feed the fishermen and their families. They sell the fish to non-fisher-
men for money. Their success brings them prestige and admiration
within their community. Even these last, intangible rewards are exter-
nal goods. A good that is internal to a practice, however, can be ob-
tained only through repeated excellence in the activity according to
the shared standards through which its participants define the prac-
tice. 183 In a later work, MacIntyre refers to these as the "goods of
excellence."'18 4  He renames external goods, "goods of effective-
ness. 1 85 Outsiders in particular might confuse awards and other tan-
reduction of moral propositions to expressions of personal taste. See generally MACINTYRE,
supra note 15, at 62-78. "[P]rotest is now almost entirely that negative phenomenon which char-
acteristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion of someone's rights in the name of
someone else's utility." Id. at 71.
178. In the absence of a shared substantive understanding of communal good, the state pro-
motes acquiescence around the policies that support state and market structures by showing how
they maximize consumer choice. See id. at 227-29.
179. Id. at 227. ("Pleonexia, a vice in the Aristotelian scheme, is now the driving force of
modern productive work.").
180. Id. at 187; accord D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 269-70; KNIGHT, supra note 13, at
146-48; CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN LUTZ, TRADITION IN THE ETHICS OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE:
RELATIVISM, THOMISM, AND PHILOSOPHY 40-42 (2004).
181. See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Partial Response to My Critics, in AFTER MACINTYRE: CRITI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORK OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 283, 284-86 (John Horton & Su-
san Mendus eds., Univ. of Notre Dame 1994) (1994).
182. Id.
183. MacIntyre claims that only those persons who are involved in a practice and who accept
the standards of excellence that define it can participate in the growth of that practice. See
MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 188-89. In presupposing engaged participation for any critical
reflection, MacIntyre fashions a variation on the Marxist concept of "praxis"-engaged revolu-
tionary thinking-that he sees as having continuing contemporary vitality. KNIGHT, supra note
13, at 188-89.
184. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 35 (1988).
185. Id.
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gible marks of achievement with the sense of accomplishment and
belonging that accompanies authentic excellence. Only the latter,
however, brings the practitioner into the realm of the virtues.186
The virtues are those human characteristics that allow persons to
obtain goods, both internal and external. At the level of the practice,
virtues are easily conflated with certain general internal goods them-
selves. But the concepts are distinguishable: virtues are human attrib-
utes, while internal goods are something like the shared experience of
putting those qualities into practice. But in order for a human trait to
qualify as a virtue, it must lead its bearer beyond success, even au-
thentic success, in individual practices.18 7 If, as MacIntyre maintains,
specific human actions are only truly intelligible in the context of a life
story, then only those qualities of mind, body, and spirit that allow us
to balance the competing demands of various practices can truly be
called virtues.'88 At a third, even higher level, the virtues not only
animate practices and individual lives but also sustain the life of the
community in its historical development through its members' corpo-
rate articulation of and search for their common good.' 89 MacIntyre
refers to this integrated ethical and theoretical history of a community
as its tradition. 190 Through their traditions, communities perpetuate
and develop their understandings of quality in human action. 19'
For MacIntyre, the narrative of a human life lacks intelligibility
when it is completely isolated from the life of the community. 92 All
the systems of activities that qualify as genuine practices bring their
186. The concept of goods internal to a practice is the linchpin for Maclntyre's attempt to
reunite self-centered instrumental thinking with other-regarding moral reasoning. He illustrates
the concept, which is vital to the general practices of family and community life, with the exam-
ple of an adult who teaches a child to play chess. At first, the child may tolerate the bother of
learning complex rules and the slow pace of the game because of the ego boost or material
rewards associated with his or her putative winning, but the child's increasing appreciation of the
game's challenges and the child's increasing skill in meeting those challenges may accompany or
even supplant the desire to win for recognition or material gain. While the external goods can be
obtained by successful cheating, the goods of excellence by their nature cannot be stolen in this
way. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 188; cf KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 156.
187. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 201-03 ("[A]ny account of the virtues in terms of
practices could only be a partial and first account.").
188. Cf id. at 219 ("[The virtues] furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and knowledge of
the good."); LUTZ, supra note 180, at 78.
189. Cf. D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 279; LUTZ, supra note 180, at 78-79.
190. See D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 220.
191. Maclntyre rejects the notion of evaluating traditions by universal criteria that transcend
any particular socially embedded tradition. For a brief discussion of Maclntyre's account of how
traditions progress or fail on their own terms, see infra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
192. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 209.
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participants deeper into that community life.193 MacIntyre argues that
community plays an indispensable role in shaping human practical
reasoning. 94 Some practices address the members' material needs;
others concern the manner in which members relate to one another.195
MacIntyre argues that no practice should be more important or less
specialized than the practice of politics. 196 In exploring the practice of
politics, MacIntyre sets out his account of a virtue that he calls "just
generosity."
In his 1999 publication of lectures entitled Dependent Rational Ani-
mals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, MacIntyre constructs an
account of human development that moves vulnerability and depen-
dence from the margins to the center. 197 Completely realized moral
agents do not just drop from the sky fully formed. Beginning life in a
state of extreme dependency, they grow and gradually take their parts
in networks of giving and receiving within, but also beyond, our imme-
diate families.' 98 MacIntyre also stresses that fully realized indepen-
dent practical reasoners are never free from dependency. They
receive as well as give. 199 MacIntyre argues that the widespread need
for reciprocity among humans comes from the inescapable vulnerabil-
ity that is part and parcel of our animality.200 If sufficiently initiated
into practices of giving and receiving, community members will de-
velop "just generosity. '201
Just generosity differs from altruism in that the former is a virtue
that informs our relationships as opposed to our capacity for self-de-
nial in pursuit of abstract ideals.202 In some sense, MacIntyre's char-
193. See id. at 190-91 ("[I]t is characteristic of [goods internal to a practice] that their achieve-
ment is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice.").
194. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 83 ("What we need from others ... to develop the
capacities of independent practical reasoners are those relationships necessary to evaluate, mod-
ify, or reject our own practical judgments ... ").
195. See MACIN-IYRE, supra note 15, at 187-88.
196. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 129.
197. MACINTYRE, supra note 16.
198. Id. at 81-83.
199. Among the virtues of acknowledged dependence, then, is "graciousness in receiving" as
well as "just generosity." Here, MacIntyre parts company from Aristotle. He criticizes Aris-
totle's idealization of the megalopsychos ("the great man") who gives to others but needs noth-
ing in return. Id. at 127; see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 82-83.
201. Cf id. at 126.
202. MacIntyre laments Adam Smith's conceptual isolation of other-regarding behavior from
reciprocity through his promotion of the term "altruism." Id. at 119-20. Implicitly counseling
the virtue of humility even when acting out of benevolence, MacIntyre goes so far as to claim
that "[w]hen men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too
easily and too completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse
than they would otherwise do." MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 221.
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acterization of this virtue of local political life brings together aspects
of Sen's understandings of sympathy and commitment. 20 3 MacIntyre
invokes a Lakota term, wancantognaka, which he describes as a par-
ticularly reciprocal form of generosity.20 4 Just generosity is not com-
patible, under MacIntyre's view, with a calculating approach to
reciprocity.20 5 Genuine personal and community growth can take
place only in networks of giving and receiving that include the vulner-
able and disabled as well as the able-bodied.20 6 The reciprocity that
the young members of a community experience is not symmetrical,
even when generational succession is accounted for.20 7 Apprentices in
the sustaining practices of the community understand that they are
someday to bear primary responsibility for meeting the bodily needs
of the community members.208 They also understand that others will
be incapable of contributing in the same way at any point in their
lives. 20 9 These disabled are, nevertheless, not charity cases to be suf-
fered, but equal members of the community. 210 In critiquing Aris-
totle's ideal of the megalopsychos, 211 who gives to but does not
receive from those he sees as being of lesser quality, MacIntyre offers
a different ideal: one who strives to understand how each person,
however deprived, contributes to the good of the community and ap-
preciates those benefits conferred.212
In a fully formed MacIntyrean community, the just community
member takes part in a continuous dialogue with his fellow commu-
nity members about the ordering and distribution of goods. This de-
liberation is the heart of the social practice that is politics. 213 The
community members' shared understanding of what it means to be
203. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
204. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 120-21 ("'Wancantognaka' names a generosity that I owe
to all those others who also owe it to me" (citing Lydia Whirlwind Soldier, Wancantognaka: The




208. Id. at 99-100.
209. Id. at 127.
210. Maclntyre has credited the disability rights movement and feminist literature on disabil-
ity as being particularly influential on the arguments he presents in Dependent Rational Animals.
See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 2-5; EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON
WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCE 75-99, 147-61 (1999) (critiquing Rawlsian equality and
offering a personal narrative of dependency care); ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN &
MARY B. MAHOWALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13-146 (1998) (exploring disability civil rights theory).
211. See supra note 198.
212. Cf. Maclntyre, supra note 17, at 127.
213. See id.
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just not only shapes their behavior within specific practices but orders
the priority of goods available from various practices and the distribu-
tion of these goods to the various members.2 14
Despite its focus on the well-being of the marginalized, it may seem
that this "revolutionary Aristotelianism" is hopelessly conservative.
On MacIntyre's account, socially generated narratives are to be evalu-
ated only for internal consistency and not subject to external, objec-
tive markers of rationality outside the tradition.215 This apparent
embrace of relativism seems to involve MacIntyrean communities in
corporate rather than individualized moral arbitrariness. 216
MacIntyre, however, sees traditions of moral enquiry moving forward
in a manner analogous to the progress made in scientific revolu-
tions.217 Although he does not propose a "scientific method" for eval-
uating moral propositions, he points out that those traditions most
likely to survive the challenges that internal contradiction and other
aspects of their own inadequacy will eventually provoke will be those
traditions that maintain openness to falsification. 218 A community
must protect itself against destructive forces, but it should not isolate
itself from the signals that indicate its fundamental failure on its own
terms.219
C. Market, State, and Community
The normative theories of both Sen and Maclntyre open up a place
for community that is not available in conventional cost-benefit
calculus. Sen expands the information base for cost-benefit analysis
but remains sensitive to both the evaluative judgments involved in set-
ting out capabilities metrics and the understandable but misguided
empiricist tendency to seek objectivity in income measurements. 220
Even with the new variables that the capabilities approach introduces,
214. Id.
215. See LUTZ, supra note 180, at 46-47.
216. For an early critique of Maclntyre's ethical theory on this point, see Robert Wachbroit, A
Genealogy of Virtues, 92 YALE L.J. 564, 575-76 (1982). For Maclntyre's reply, see MACINTYRE,
supra note 15, at 275-77.
217. Maclntyre draws upon the related but distinct philosophies of science of Thomas Kuhn
and Imrd Lakatos. See D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 215-16 ("Maclntyre argues that we should
steer a middle path between ... Kuhn ... (according to which the move from Theory A to rival
Theory B can only occcur by... an intuitive seeing of the mattter in entirely different light), and
the quasi-historical rationalism of Imr6 Lakatos."); LUTZ, supra note 180, at 48-49 (noting that
Lakatos' account of theoretical progress involves one scientific research program yielding to the
superior predictive capacity of a rival research program).
218. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 197.
219. For a discussion of how this issue relates to legal scholarship concerning the importance
of "exit" in sustaining healthy communities, see infra notes 273-275 and accompanying text.
220. See SEN, supra note 23, at 81.
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Sen's perspective remains that of a social engineer, and his prescrip-
tions are fundamentally technocratic. His insights support external
appreciation of social inclusion, conviviality, and solidarity as forms of
social capital that provide a baseline for the holistic success of individ-
ual community members. MacIntyre, on the other hand, moves the
focus of human flourishing from effectiveness in meeting perceived
needs and wants to a sense of personal excellence, grounded in human
vulnerability and interdependence. Within Maclntyre's framework,
persons making internal resource decisions for themselves and their
community members should reject cost-benefit analysis out of hand as
a short-circuiting of the deliberation that is essential to the authentic
practice of politics. 221
Although MacIntyre draws a sharp distinction between institutions
and practices, one that parallels the key difference between goods of
effectiveness and goods of excellence, he recognizes that communal
practices that provide for basic human needs cannot subsist without
institutional support.2 22 A reading of MacIntyre offers guidance as to
the size and other basic characteristics of suitable structures. First, the
structures must be intimate enough to allow for the close personal
cooperative activity through which shared understanding of the com-
mon good is discerned and communicated.223 Second, they must be
large enough to meet the needs of their members who are living in a
world that is hostile to their goals.2 24 Third, and most importantly, the
institutions themselves must be subordinated to the practices they
support and the internal goods that those practices offer.225 With
these criteria in mind, we can now evaluate the nation-state, the fam-
ily, and the neighborhood-based development organizations as social
structures capable of supporting an authentic politics of the common
good.
221. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 129, 145. As community members express the value of
their communal strength to policy makers, nothing about their self-understanding prevents them
from articulating this solidarity in the policy-conversant terms of bridging, bonding, and animat-
ing forms of social capital. See infra Part IV (arguing that CLTs should be internally guided by
MacIntyre's thought even as they make a policy case for external support in terms supported by
Sen's approach).
222. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 194; D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 270; KNIGHT, supra
note 13, at 158.
223. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 129, 132-33.
224. Id. at 134-35.
225. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 194 ("[T]he cooperative care for common goods of the
practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution."). Certain virtues-such
as truthfulness, justice, and courage-are particularly important in ensuring that a preoccupa-
tion with external goods does not allow institutions to debase the practices that they are sup-
posed to embody and sustain. Id. at 194; KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 158.
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The first condition alone disqualifies contemporary governmental
entities as institutional sites around which flourishing communities
can be formed. Although MacIntyre has understandably been de-
scribed as a communitarian, he has rejected that label vociferously.226
He identifies the communitarian cause with claims that the state must
adopt some minimal notion of the good in order to function and that it
can do so to the benefit of its constituents. 227 MacIntyre agrees with
the communitarians on the former point, namely, that the state cannot
function without adopting some substantive notion of the good. 228 On
the latter point, however, MacIntyre insists that any attempt by the
nation-state, or any large governmental entity, to embody a meaning-
ful understanding of the human good inevitably degenerates into na-
tionalistic totalitarianism. 229
The second requirement-that the structures must be large enough
to meet the developmental needs of their members-leads Maclntyre
to reject the notion that the nuclear, or even extended, family can
itself foster networks of giving and receiving of sufficient size and
scope.2 30 MacIntyre does not attack the family as an obstacle to au-
thentic human development as he does with both the state and the
market.231  Indeed, the generous reciprocity typical of family life
seems to offer a commonplace, contemporary example of the quality
of relationships that MacIntyre pictures as extending beyond kinship
groups. He rejects the family, however, as the fundamental form of
association in which the virtues can be cultivated because it is too
small to be anything but dependent on the surrounding social
environment.2 32
226. See MacIntyre, supra note 181, at 302.
227. Id.
228. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 252-53 ("[M]odern politics cannot be a matter of gen-
uine moral consensus.... [It] is civil war carried on by other means."); Murphy, supra note 21, at
154-60 ("Maclntyre agrees with the communitarians against the liberals that the neutralist state
must lack authority.").
229. Cf. D'ANDREA, supra note 20, at 424; Murphy, supra note 21, at 159-60 ("MacIntyre
agrees with liberals against the communitarians that a non-neutralist state is, in the end, intolera-
ble."). The apparent contradiction in MacIntyre's beliefs that the state must adopt a notion of
the common good and that the state should not do so is resolved by MacIntyre's view that the
modern state is an inherently self-contradictory institution that cannot succeed, even on its own
terms. Cf. Murphy, supra note 21, at 160.
230. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 133-35.
231. Cf. KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 185. ("Less antagonizing has been MacIntyre's account of
the family as a 'practice-embodying institution'..... [lit is the main institution within which most
people experience mutually beneficial relations of giving and receiving and of critical scrutiny of
actions and reasons.")
232. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 132-34.
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These scale boundaries, both upper and lower, point those who
would follow MacIntyre's guidance toward local community institu-
tions. An advocate of community economic development will recog-
nize in MacIntyre's vision not only a mix of the practical and the high-
minded but also the size of institutions offered by the community de-
velopment movement: big enough to have a meaningful impact yet
small enough to be responsive to individual community members' in-
put.233 MacIntyre's description of the proper scale for authentic polit-
ics puts the reader even more clearly in mind of a neighborhood:
Neither the state nor the family then is the form of association
whose common good is to be both served and sustained by the vir-
tues of acknowledged dependence. It must instead be some form of
local community within which the activities of families, workplaces,
schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to
games and sports, and religious congregations may all find a
place.23
4
The size of an inner-city neighborhood seems to be just right for both
the closeness and the diversity that is necessary to support social
practices. But scale is not the only concern.
Given MacIntyre's vision of a community's social practices forming
a single, coherent tradition, residents of inner-city neighborhoods
might wonder how such a political model would have any relevance to
their pluralistic communities or the particularized struggles in which
they are engaged. The virtues that members demonstrate in commu-
nal deliberations are the same ones that they acquire in community
sports and creative activities. Every community member need not be
a renaissance person, excelling in a wide range of pursuits, but it ap-
pears that authentic politics can only fully develop in a community
that is well-rounded and coherent in its moral vision.235 Even an im-
pressively engaged neighborhood such as Dudley Street does not
seem to match up with MacIntyre's vision of a group of persons with a
233. Keith Breen rejects Maclntyre's localism for the same reason that MacIntyre himself
cannot fully embrace a form of anarchism that would hold the family up as the ideal association
for moral development. Breen contends that local communities are inherently dependent on the
state to provide moral as well as economic goods. See Keith Breen, The State, Compartmental-
ization and the Turn to Local Community: A Critique of the Political Thought of Alasdair
MacIntyre, 10 EUROPEAN LEGACY 485, 494-96 (2005). Breen argues that by limiting authentic
political discourse to the communal level, Maclntyre has ceded the world of large-scale politics
and the many important issues that can be resolved in it alone to his Weberian adversaries. Id. at
498.
234. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 135.
235. Thomas D'Andrea has observed that Maclntyre's romanticism of rural life has created an
overly pessimistic view of the possibility for radical democracy in the city. See D'ANDREA, supra
note 20, at 422.
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basic agreement about what constitutes their common good.236 As
complete and idyllic as his picture of craft practitioners who are en-
gaged in a joint search for the common good seems to be, 237
MacIntyre assures his readers that his ethics is not a program to
achieve some perfected state of affairs and that isolated creative
projects of resistance provide encouraging examples of the community
action he supports. 238
MacIntyre suggests that the social foundations for any move toward
promoting the virtues will come from community-based projects that
challenge dominance by market and state institutions.239 The suc-
cesses of the low-income residents of Roxbury and Central Los Ange-
les offer positive examples of both the engagement with and the active
resistance toward the market and the state that MacIntyre sees as nec-
essary for any community of the common good to exist in the contem-
porary world. The people of Dudley Street and the Figueroa Corridor
clearly illustrate how
[t]o be good, to live rightly, and to think rightly... is to be engaged
in struggle and a perfected life is one perfected in key part in and
through conflicts .... [This includes] those engaged in by members
of some rank and file trade union movements, of some tenants' as-
sociations, of the disability movement, of a variety of farming, fish-
ing, and trading cooperatives .... 240
Many communities struggling for justice cannot now and may never
achieve the wholeness that Maclntyre depicts as weaving morality,
theoretical understanding, art, and productivity together. But his call
for attention to the virtues as a form of resistance is not limited to
236. If anything, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, with four different ethnic and
racial groups represented on its board, is more impacted by the pluralism that characterizes cities
both in the United States and worldwide. DSNI has worked hard to engage all of the cultures in
the community by providing real-time translation of community meetings and by sponsoring
diversity activities. See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 7, at 57, 256-58.
237. MacIntyre's insistence on the unity of a community's tradition may seem hopelessly
anachronistic in our thoroughly pluralist modern world. "Welsh mining communities,... farm-
ing cooperatives in Donegal [Ireland], [and] Mayan towns in Guatemala and Mexico" are of-
fered as contemporary heirs to the democratic excellence of the Greek "city-states from a more
distant past." MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 143. But Maclntyre offers these somewhat fragile
and isolated examples as opportunities to better understand the travails of fully integrated com-
munities in the modern world, rather than holding them out as models for the authentic develop-
ment of inner-city urban neighborhoods. Cf id.
238. Alasdair Maclntyre, Book Review, U. NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV. (2006) (reviewing RAY-
MOND GUESS, OUTSIDE ETHICS (2005)), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=5922; KNIGHT, supra
note 13, at 180-83; see infra text accompanying note 240.
239. Cf. Maclntyre, supra note 238; KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 180-83 (discussing Maclntyre's
account of how authentic communal projects persist despite the dominance of bureaucratic
institutions).
240. Maclntyre, supra note 238.
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idealized villages. Any group that acts to achieve basic social equality
through radical democracy can help to bring about its own flourishing
as human beings. The residents of an inner-city neighborhood are not
excluded from this progress merely because of their diversity or even
their mobility.241 On the other hand, nothing about the appropriate
scale of a community warrants complacency in the development of an
authentic political dialogue. MacIntyre denies that "there is anything
good about local community as such." 242 Local community structures
are particularly prone to provincial failings such as bigotry, self-satis-
faction, internal domination, corruption, and narrow-mindedness.2 43
Key to the success of local communities in sustaining practices that
will cultivate the requisite virtues will be the types of institutions they
form to sustain the networks of giving and receiving.
IV. LAND FOR GOOD: STEWARDSHIP AND
SUSTAINING COMMUNITIES
MacIntyre's project of breaking down the division between pruden-
tial and other-regarding modes of practical reasoning echoes Sen's cri-
tique of contemporary economists' failure to acknowledge the
relevance of rational motivation that is other-regarding. Community
Land Trusts, as nonprofit organizations dedicated to ideals of social
welfare but democratically controlled to reflect the actual interests of
community members, also straddle this separation between effective-
ness and moral excellence. In integrating understandings of irreduci-
ble goods and of other-regarding motivation, Sen is careful to
preserve workable metrics for policy analysis.2 44 MacIntyre rejects
this calculation altogether in favor of a communal deliberation that is
241. Although MacIntyre generally reinforces the importance of the moral unity of a virtue-
centered community by referring to "community" in the singular, he adds that
[w]e are often members of more than one community and we may find a place within
more than one network of giving and receiving. Moreover we move in and out of
communities. If therefore from now on I continue for simplicity's sake to speak of the
community or network to which someone belongs, the reader should supply the missing
arm of the disjunctions: 'community or communities', 'network or networks.'
MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 122-23 (emphasis omitted).
242. Id. at 142.
243. For a discussion of undemocratic community organizations from the perspective of com-
munity lawyers, see generally Michael Diamond & Aaron O'Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free
Riders: The Community Lawyer's Dilemma When Representing Non-Democratic Client Organi-
zations, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481 (2004).
244. See SEN, supra note 23, at 75 ("The amount or the extent of each functioning enjoyed by
a person may be represented by a real number, and when this is done, a person's actual achieve-
ment can be seen as a functioning vector. The 'capability set' would consist of the alternative
functioning vectors that she can choose from.").
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accountable only to the virtues, especially to just generosity.245 But
intentional imprecision in reciprocity can well serve residents of an
economically diverse community, as long as they do not cut them-
selves off from crucial feedback.
Community Land Trusts move away from the market's allocation
information in the contexts of housing and open space management.
They create inclusionary housing by making homes available at be-
low-market prices. 246 CLTs keep the investment in social equality lo-
cal by limiting the resale of the property.247 CLTs offer the public
good of recreational space in order to bring together the diverse com-
munities that they have fostered.248 By retaining corporate ownership
of the land, members of the community are able to allocate these re-
sources in a manner consistent with their interests and commitment to
just generosity. In this Part of the Article, the discussion will turn to
how a CLT's interaction with the market, the state, and its own mem-
bers might beneficially reflect the neo-Aristotelian ideas of Amartya
Sen and, in particular, those of Alasdair MacIntyre.
A. Contending with the Market
Both Sen and MacIntyre argue for cooperative efforts-specifically,
efforts to increase equality-that pay attention to the actual availabil-
ity of basic goods such as housing, education, and social inclusion. 249
An unrestricted market will not spontaneously generate this move-
ment and may work to undo attempts to promote equality through in-
kind assistance. 250 In this context, rules prohibiting the cashing-in of
these benefits are promoted, and criticized, as paternalistic attempts
to protect marginalized recipients against the same poor judgment
that is presumed to have caused their need for help in the first
place.251 This condescending view of the appropriate scope and func-
tion of inalienability rules does not give a full account of their benefits
for the property owner and says nothing about their social benefits.
Peggy Radin moves beyond consequentialist concerns by showing
how removing certain goods from the domain of commodities sup-
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See supra Part I.B.1.
247. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.B.2.
249. See supra Part III.A, B.
250. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931, 959-60 (1985).
251. For a more abstract framing of paternalistic inalienability, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (1972).
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ports property relationships that are constitutive of personhood. 252
She and others have pointed to the home as a prime example of a
property relationship that has resisted complete commodification be-
cause of its importance to the self.253 But the investigation of the so-
cial benefits of inalienability has come from a more utilitarian
perspective. A law and economics dialogue-once dominated by calls
for maximizing the realm of the free market-now includes the recog-
nition by some of the relevance of alienability restrictions to support-
ing community and other social goods. 25 4
Structuring property entitlements to shape how the market allo-
cates resources has been a favorite topic of legal scholarship for three
decades. In Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed set
out a three-part taxonomy of property rights protection that has
sparked an enduring interest in how property law increases or de-
creases the prospects for efficient transfers.2 55 Liability rule entitle-
ments, which are protected only by money damages, generally allow
for involuntary compensated transfers. 256 On the other hand, trans-
fers of property rule entitlements, which are protected by injunctive
relief, require the consent of the holders, some of whom may hold out
for exorbitant premiums. 257 Inalienable rights are even less liquid in
that they cannot be legally transferred even with the cooperation of
the owner. 258 Those advocating maximum availability of efficiency-
promoting transfers have pressed for favoring liability rule protection
252. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
991-1002 (1982) (discussing sanctity of the home).
253. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 108-10 (1996); accord Benja-
min Barros, Home As a Legal Concept, 46 S. CLARA L. REV. 255, 282-300 (2006) (surveying
legal doctrines that balance and that fail to balance the importance of home with competing
interests); Lorna Fox, The Idea of Home in Law, 2 HOME CUUrURES 25, 26-27 (2005) (providing
an analysis of residential ownership as an internationally protected human right in the context of
foreclosure); James J. Kelly, Jr., "We Shall Not Be Moved": Urban Communities, Eminent Do-
main and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 923, 958-61 (2006)
(showing that owners of homes taken by eminent domain are often not adequately compensated
by payment of market value). But see Stephanie Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal
Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1110-15 (disputing treating homes as constitutive
of the personal identities of the resident owners).
254. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1451-57
(2009) (noting that resale restrictions can filter out buyers who do not focus on use value of the
property); Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L.REv. 137, 200-02 (2008) (exam-
ining CLTs as an innovative mixed property regime)
255. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 251, at 1092-93.
256. Id. at 1092.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1092-93.
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of entitlements. 259 But more recently, advocates of property rules and
even inalienability rules have been able to make the case for the social
benefits of these types of entitlement protections as well. 260
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have argued that prop-
erty rule approaches can better promote social gains associated with
stability in voluntary ownership. 261 If an owner values his or her prop-
erty more highly than the market does, a compelled transfer to some-
one who is willing to pay only the market price could be an inefficient
reallocation. 262 Fennell has proposed a system of "revealing options"
to elicit the amount of this owner surplus so as to allow it to be more
precisely protected.263 The difference between use value and ex-
change value also plays a central role in justifying certain efficient de-
ployments of inalienability rules.
In her recently published article, Adjusting Alienability,264 Lee Fen-
nell shows that alienation restrictions are able not only to stabilize
attempts at redistribution but also to support, rather than to frustrate,
attempts to allocate goods, such as community membership, to those
who will put them to highest and best use. As the article's title sug-
gests, Fennell emphasizes that the right to transfer one's property "is
not a binary switch to be turned on or off."'265 Alienability can be
shaped to minimize the harms that are created by blocking efficient
transfers to users who genuinely value the property more highly while
offering benefits that tailored alienability restrictions might uniquely,
or at least most effectively, offer.266 Fennell shows that, in circum-
259. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-756 (1996) (finding that the deployment of liability
rules is unambiguously superior in the context of harmful externalities, but not in the property
rights arena).
260. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 254, at 1451-57 (explaining the utility of inalienability rule
protection in certain circumstances); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1719, 1754-91 (2004) (exploring the information cost advantages provided by use of prop-
erty rules).
261. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 615 (2005).
262. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines As
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973); Kelly, supra note 253, at 950-51.
263. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV 1399, 1433-37 (2005)
(explaining the uses of mandatory self-made options); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Do-
main Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 995-96 (applying self-assessed valuation to the problem
of efficiently pricing subjectively valued property in an eminent domain condemnation).
264. Fennell, supra note 254.
265. Id. at 1408.
266. Fennell's project of blurring the line between alienability and inalienability is, in many
ways, analogous to the work that Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchmovosky have done. Their
work involved identifying and promoting the utility of what they call "pliability rules," which are
rules that adjust along the boundary of strong, injunction-based protection and more flexible,
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stances where the goal of transfer is to ensure the maximum in-kind
valuation of the property, alienability restrictions can promote self-
selection among buyers, thereby weeding out speculators. 267 Pricing
mechanisms and screening processes may provide alternative but not
as efficient means of achieving this same goal.268 With regard to the
purchase of a primary residence, differences in so-called willingness to
pay reflect income disparities more than actual consumer valuations
of homes and community memberships. Thus, monetary pricing of
the property will not necessarily transfer the property to those who
value it most for its opportunity to provide the shared goods of com-
munity. Instead, the property may go to those who value these goods
less but have the finances available to bid the property up. A subsidy-
based approach can avoid this result by pricing the property suffi-
ciently below market in order to attract a large pool of willing, in-
come-qualified buyers. The buyers could then be interviewed to see
not only if they highly value membership in the community but also if
they meet other characteristics that are attractive to those interested
in creating an economically diverse community of choice. Fennell,
like Rose-Ackerman before her, points out that a restriction on the
alienability of the property can discourage those who are more inter-
ested in the exchange value than the use value of the property from
even attempting to purchase it.269 These alienability restrictions do
not need to replace pricing, or especially, screening mechanisms as
important evaluators of potential buyers, but the self-selection process
can be an important tool to attract persons ready to increase the com-
munity's social capital.
Fennell suggests that put options can help avoid trapping entitle-
ment holders who are subjected to alienability restrictions.270 A put
option, the inverse of a call option, allows the entitlement holder to
demand an identified buyer to purchase the property at a preset price.
damages-based protection. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002). For examples of pliability rule approaches to homeownership and
community control of land resources, see Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind
the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807,
1875-78 (2004) (proposing a community referendum on specific or monetary relief in environ-
mental justice cases); Fennell, supra note 263, at 995-96 (proposing that homeowners be allowed
to opt out of vulnerability to condemnation by paying a premium on their property taxes);
Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008) (propos-
ing the enabling of collective bargaining to overcome holdout problems that are usually resolved
by eminent domain): Kelly, supra note 253 (proposing increased property rule protection for
residential condemnees in urban redevelopment projects).
267. See Fennell, supra note 254, at 1453.
268. See id.
269. Id. (citing Rose-Ackerman, supra note 250, at 940).
270. Id. at 1457.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
In this way, a homeowner whose desire to remain in the house de-
creases can be assured that alienability restrictions will not prevent
him or her from having the freedom to move. By structuring their
resale restrictions as preemptive options, CLTs achieve these same
goals. The CLT never prohibits the homeowners from selling their
homes; instead, it requires that they notify the land trust when the
homeowners decide to sell. 271 The land trust, then, has a certain pre-
scribed period of time to purchase the property at the price set by the
formula.272
As important as it is to be able to attract residents to a community
who truly value membership for its own sake, the land trust alienabil-
ity structure is set up in anticipation of expected changes. 273 Even if
the land trust model may promote stability in homeownership, it is
also designed to accommodate the mobility that is a fact of life, partic-
ularly in urban communities. The need to structure exit provisions for
homeowners offers another salient feature that is important for the
overall health of the community.
By weeding out speculative buyers, alienability restrictions do not
encourage purchase by people who are committed to community in
the abstract so much as people who value the particular community
they are joining. If their desire to remain in that community changes
not because of a change in their own life situations, but because the
community itself is no longer as attractive, then severe alienability re-
strictions might hamper important early signals of community distress.
In inner-city communities where interdependence is a lived reality, it
may be even more important for the community not to insulate itself
from indications that its members are becoming more likely to secede.
Alasdair MacIntyre has written that a community seeking to preserve
its traditions against the influence of the market and state has omi-
nously suggested that it may be necessary to impose "limits to labor
mobility. ' ' 274 However, as discussed in the previous Section,275 his un-
derlying philosophy of community sustainability ultimately values the
271. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text; see also Kelly, supra note 79.
272. The language of the option generally allows the CLT to assign its rights to a qualified
homebuyer. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 13-21 to 13-24.
273. For a discussion of the importance of planning for the future need to adjust alienability
restrictions on subsidized homes, see Kelly, supra note 79.
274. MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 145.
275. See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
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falsification information that gradual exit of community members can
provide.276
MacIntyre approaches the fundamental questions underlying com-
munity control of vital resources from the viewpoint of the community
members themselves. 277 MacIntyre insists that an authentic ordering
of a community's tangible economic resources must come from the
members' shared understandings of and communal deliberations
about the common good.2 78 His focus is on the need to control those
resources that protect the integrity of the networks of giving and re-
ceiving, which are essential to an authentic and sustainable politics. 279
Although his vision is deliberately devoid of detail, inclusive commu-
nity membership and community-based decision making on questions
that relate to the common good are fundamental. As uncompromis-
ing as MacIntyre's call for decommodification of community member-
ship is, his insistence that a community remain open to signals of
unsustainability also supports a measured approach to restricting the
resale of CLT homes. This moderate approach to collectivization res-
onates with contemporary commons legal scholarship that emphasizes
the importance of exit options to sustainability.
By judicious use and retention of housing subsidies, CLTs can cre-
ate and sustain economic diversity in communities that are truly char-
acterized by choice. In setting resale formulas that share some of the
equity appreciation, the CLT membership as a whole exemplifies just
generosity for both current and future CLT homeowners. 280 The
shared belief in the possibility of a multi-class neighborhood produces
various kinds of important social capital but is not itself driven by the
goal of optimizing social capital. 281 It is instead a commitment to de-
velopment and improvement without displacement and exclusion.
276. For a discussion of the issues of "exit" in communal reform movements in Israel, see
generally Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRES L. 43 (2009).
277. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 129-30, 144-45.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. The terms of the resale formula constitute a core policy decision for the Community
Land Trust. As such, adoption and amendment of the formula is generally put to a vote of the
entire CLT membership. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 5-40 to 5-41 (noting that
even those CLTs that empower the Board to set the original resale formula often require that
any amendment of it be ratified by the membership).
281. Peter Byrne and Michael Diamond have rightly criticized as a "strawman" Robert Ellick-
son's hypothetical "Waring Blender" model of neighborhood social composition in which every
neighborhood would be engineered to be precisely reflective of the social composition of the
general population as a whole. J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land
Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 564 (2007) (citing
Robert C. Ellickson, The Puzzle of the Optimal Social Composition of Neighborhoods, in THE
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Residents of various economic disposition show just generosity not by
demanding a neighborhood that precisely reflects the social composi-
tion of the entire region as a whole. This depiction of community
egalitarianism would be as distorted as a caricature of a Tieboutian
household that would refuse to stay in a neighborhood unless every-
one in it was socioeconomically identical to it.282 By adjusting the
alienability of subsidized homes, CLTs make room for sustained im-
precision in reciprocity.
CLTs fashion a residential property model for what Wallace Stegner
referred to as the "stickers," which are persons whose relationship
with the land and the community are constitutive parts of their lives
rather than stepping stones to an imagined optimal future.283
Maclntyre understands human flourishing as necessarily involving au-
thentic relationships among persons, able-bodied and disabled alike,
sustained through networks of giving and receiving. 284 However, his
radical rejection of instrumentalism also opens the door to an ethic of
community that includes the land itself.285 Everything about life in an
inner-city neighborhood would seem to cut against both long-term
planning and awareness of the land. Poverty, violence, and substance
abuse provide just some of the occasions for recurring crises. The lack
of natural features would seem to make land a historical rather than
present reality. Yet CLT community members are embracing care of
the land not only as that which literally brings them together but as an
integral feature of their lives with one another.28 6 In protecting not
only affordable housing but natural spaces in their neighborhoods,
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 199,
201 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006)).
282. Tiebout's theory that homebuyers, when choosing residential locations, are shopping for
a basket of locally provided public goods, has dominated law and economics discourse on local
government issues. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956); accord WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLI-
CIES (2001).
283. WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS: LIVING
AND WRITING IN THE WEST xxvii (2002).
284. See supra Part IlI.B.
285. Eric Freyfogle has advocated land use and conservation practices that express the "land
ethic" of Aldo Leopold: "A thing is right ... when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community." FREYFOGLE, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting ALDO LEOPOLD, A
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224-25 (1949)). Leopold's concep-
tion of "the biotic community" includes the land itself as something "akin to a living organism."
Id. at 136.
286. See supra Part II.B.2. For an exploration of the connection between urban community
gardens and the environmental conservation movement, see PETER FORBES, THE GREAT RE-
MEMBERING: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON LAND, SOUL, AND SOCIETY 49-55 (2001).
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they are fostering communities that are not only extensive in their
diversity but also intensive in their sense of conviviality.
B. Governmental Control or Community Control?
Although the permanent affordability of homes remains the core
issue for CLTs, the control of shared spaces also raises issues as to the
need for small parks and community gardens to be controlled by dem-
ocratically controlled nonprofit organizations, as opposed to local gov-
ernments that are less directly accountable to residents. This
discussion of local versus sublocal stewardship over neighborhood
gathering spaces in turn leads to questions of how a community deci-
sion making process within a CLT would differ from the land use plan-
ning processes that are typically offered by municipal parks
departments. Together, the two issues offer an opportunity to explore
the practical and philosophical implications of community conserva-
tion in a neo-Aristotelian mode.
Partnership agreements between local community groups and mu-
nicipal parks departments can accomplish many of the benefits of
community investment and can increase confidence in local govern-
ments' commitments to preserve small-scale amenities such as parks
and gardens. In cities facing long-term economic decline, community
groups looking to steward green space may find themselves in long-
term agreements with municipal governments looking to "right size"
their jurisdictions. 28 7 But in cities with rapidly appreciating real estate
markets, there may be no substitute for CLT title ownership of these
green jewels of open space.288
A deeper understanding of the social theory behind Community
Land Trusts helps their proponents develop them appropriately as
they contend with and complement dominant market and state institu-
tions. The seemingly anarchist vision of Alasdair MacIntyre provides
that popularly controlled local institutions are essential for the proper
287. See Joseph Schilling, Blueprint Buffalo-Using Green Infrastructure to Reclaim
America's Shrinking Cities, http://metrostudies.berkeley.edu/publications/proceedings/Shrink-
ing/18SchillingPA-final.pdf. As one Michigan local government official said recently, "If it's
going to look abandoned, let it be clean and green .... Create the new Flint forest-something
people will choose to live near, rather than something that symbolizes failure." David Streitfeld,
In Flint, Mich., Fighting to Save a Failing Town by Shrinking It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at
A12.
288. This commitment to protecting natural features against destructive development might
be especially important for land that plays a key role in the neighborhood watershed. For a
discussion of how urban conservation practices impact storm water runoff into environmentally
sensitive streams and bays, see Miriam Avins, "What You Can Do with a Vacant Lot": The Role
of Community Gardens and Pocket Parks in a Sustainable Land Bank Plan (August 7, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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stewardship of basic resources that are necessary to "the networks of
giving and receiving" that are at the center of a just community. 289
Moreover, these institutions must be prepared for constant, if only
arms-length, engagement with the private businesses and state agen-
cies that control the public as well as private goods that the commu-
nity cannot do without.290 It would seem that MacIntyre's categorical
mistrust of corporate and governmental bureaucracies would push
communities influenced by his thinking to insist on complete and di-
rect control over all community space land resources. 291 But even
though the virtues clearly counsel a long-term view that resists preoc-
cupation with external goods, nothing about the "politics of self-de-
fense" prevents an authentically pragmatic approach to the mode of
community control over common space.
Appropriate community governance of a CLT and other institutions
of neighborhood economic empowerment require ongoing delibera-
tion as to the interests and ideals of the community. The governing
documents will include certain commitments to charitable goals of the
organizations. In certain program areas, such as affordable housing,
these priorities will often be quite specific. But more importantly,
CLT bylaws reserve the control of certain essential aspects of the or-
ganization's mission to the membership itself. The formula for calcu-
lating the option price for CLT homes expresses such a core element
of the organizational mission that its original enactment and subse-
quent amendment are reserved to the CLT membership as a whole. 292
Likewise, any decision to sell CLT land is presumed to be contrary to
the organizational mission and must be ratified by the CLT member-
ship.293 But procedures cannot produce authentic dialogue; instead
they can only make room for it.
The substance of community discussions over how to protect and
use land resources must reflect the traditions and lived experiences of
the community members. Without some shared understanding of the
common good, even a small-scale organization will become a forum
for competing interests arbitrarily asserting claims. But by drawing
upon the problem-solving resources that helped them not only to sur-
vive but also to create their CLTs, these communities will be able to
articulate land use plans that reflect both their common interests and
289. See supra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 287-288 and accompanying text.
291. The more consequentialist capabilities approach of Sen, on the other hand, would point
toward an empirical examination of whether or not community control yielded increased bene-
fits, including greater social capital. See supra Part 1IB.1.
292. See INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 10, at 5-40 to 5-41.
293. Id. at 5-38 to 5-39.
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ideals.2 94 If they keep themselves open to information that may call
into question their achievements or success, they may discern the need
to make fundamental changes in their approach to the control of land
resources.
In addition to, or in lieu of, pursuing outside resources for commu-
nity amenities and inclusionary subsidies, CLTs may try to institute a
way of marshaling the monetary wealth of their own community. For
years, law and economics scholars have written about transplanting
the idea of homeowners associations to existing urban neighbor-
hoods.295 Now, special assessments imposed by community referenda
are funding community benefits districts in Maryland.296 But the deci-
sion to pursue this strategy should be the product of deliberation on
how it would advance that community's understanding of the common
good of all its members, not just those who are most likely to contrib-
ute to some optimal assortment of public goods.
Similarly, the resident members of a CLT may see the need to con-
nect with other communities with similar interests, ideas, and issues.
Scott Cummings has cited the constructive efforts of the Figueroa
Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice as a model for progressive
coalitions that can both demand and create social justice.2 97 As with
any such efforts, there will be disagreements and conflicts over how to
proceed. It is certainly possible that the resolution of these differ-
ences will be determined purely by which group has more power rela-
tive to the other; however, with some shared understanding of the
justice of their common cause and a commitment to truthfulness and
just generosity, neo-Aristotelian organizing might produce deeper un-
derstanding and empowering bonds between groups. 298
V. CONCLUSION
The Community Development movement arose from the ideals,
strategies, and victories of the Civil Rights and Community Organiz-
294. For a postmodernist approach to collective problem solving that takes community tradi-
tions seriously, see generally Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around
Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004).
295. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75
(1998); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25
URB. LAW. 335 (1993); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 827 (1999).
296. See R. Lisle Baker, Using Special Assessments As a Tool for Smart Growth: Louisville's
New Metro Government As a Potential Example, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 26-27 (2006).
297. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 303-04, 313-30.
298. For a discussion of the importance of the neo-Nietszchean virtue of receptive generosity
in progressive coalitions, see Coles, supra note 14, at 381-86.
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ing movements. 299 The latter brought about the defeat of Urban Re-
newal by grassroots neighborhood organizations that were scattered
throughout America's inner-cities.300 The planned decimation of via-
ble working class and poor urban communities inspired not only con-
stant vigilance but also proactive economic planning among city
dwellers. Defending the community space against large private and
public interests has been the hallmark of the community organizing
movement and many of the development organizations that it has in-
spired. As the Urban Renewal era ended, gentrification of certain ur-
ban communities was recognized as the new threat.301 Even the most
well-intentioned efforts to revitalize struggling neighborhoods were
regarded with suspicion because vanguard strategies to secure an area
for more affluent taxpayers thereby displaced current residents who
were unable to keep up with the rising tide of rents and property tax
obligations. The Dudley Street Neighborhood determined that the
proximity of its Roxbury neighborhood to some of the fast growing
areas in Boston demanded a long-term land control strategy. Once
they had control of the land, they wanted not only to generate the
initial development plans but to retain sufficient control in order to
ensure community-supportive uses into the distant future. Similarly,
organized residents of the Figueroa Corridor succeeded in securing
housing trust funds from the City of Los Angeles as part of a commu-
nity benefits agreement that made construction of the Staples Center
possible.302 They also saw that investment presented critical displace-
ment pressures that could only be addressed through the long-term
dedication of land to affordable housing.30 3
The successes of the low-income residents of Roxbury and Central
Los Angeles offer positive examples of both the engagement with and
the active resistance toward the market and the state that MacIntyre
sees as necessary for any community of the common good in the con-
temporary world. The very nature of the cooperative activity that the
people of Dudley Street have undertaken scarcely allows them indi-
vidualistic detachment from one another. The creation of new archi-
299. See Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development As Progressive Politics: To-
ward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399, 413-21 (2001) (re-
counting how civil rights advocacy led to federal funding for community development and how
Alinsky's neighborhood organizing gave rise to grassroots political coalitions for economic
justice).
300. McFarlane, supra note 49, at 871-75.
301. John A. Powell, & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old "One-Two": Gentrifica-
tion and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433, 435-54 (2003).
302. Cummings, supra note 5, at 322.
303. Id.
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tecture and public art requires exploration of their needs, their
history, and their hopes for the future. The questions of how to allo-
cate scarce resources continually presents them with issues of internal
justice. The selection of residents for new housing, if it is to be sus-
tained, cannot be founded merely on procedurally engineered com-
promise among factional interests, but on a growing sense of the good
that this housing venture is serving. This entails reflection on the fun-
damental inadequacies of the market and the state in meeting basic
human needs and further exploration of the new residents as contrib-
uting members of the growing community.
The formation of a CLT in no way guarantees MacIntyre's "goods
of conflict," much less the networks of giving and receiving through
which justice and just generosity, as well as commitments to truth and
beauty, are cultivated. A CLT is an institution, hopefully one that al-
lows for, and even encourages, a local politics that is oriented toward
justice. The neighborhood proponents of the CLT model understand,
along with MacIntyre, that the true value of its structure is its contri-
bution to the possibility for, rather than assurance of, genuine sustain-
able community. The CLT exemplifies the sort of intermediate
institution that MacIntyre delimits by rejecting both the state and the
family as primary institutions for political deliberation and action. By
reserving the vital resources of land for community control, the foun-
dation and development of the CLT places its members and their
shared understanding of the goods and the common good for which
land should be used in conflict with the state and especially the mar-
ket. Community economic development activists, especially those
who are veterans of the community organizing movement, understand
the vital role that this conflict plays in defining and strengthening the
community's polity.
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